Musharraf doesn't need any more enemies

By Con Coughlin


It is never a clever idea to upset the world's leading superpower, particularly when you are supposed to be a key ally fighting a common enemy. General Zia al-Huq, the military dictator who seized control of Pakistan from 1977 to 1988, worked closely with Washington to evict the Soviet army from Afghanistan.

But shortly after Zia dismissed the government and threatened the imposition of martial law, he was killed when the C-130 flying him to Islamabad mysteriously exploded in mid-air.

Hamid Gul, the head of Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency at the time, later accused the CIA of causing the crash, even though it also killed Arnold Raphael, the US Ambassador to Pakistan. Whatever the cause, with Zia out of the way, Pakistan undertook yet another awkward transition to democracy.

advertisementNo one is suggesting that the Asian desk at the CIA is working overtime studying the Pakistani military's presidential flight schedules.

But, by the same token, General Musharraf should be under no illusion about the anger he has provoked within the Bush Administration over his decision to impose martial law and round up hundreds of political activists.

It's not as if President Bush does not have enough on his plate, prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, persuading the Iranians to give up their nuclear programme and negotiating with the Turks over their threat to invade Iraq.

Now Mr Bush must grapple with the prospect of a civil war erupting in a country whose support is regarded as vital to defeating al-Qa'eda.

Gen Musharraf has a reputation for living dangerously, and by ignoring Washington's advice and in effect staging a coup against himself, he has incurred America's wrath.

The mounting political instability in Pakistan has been worrying Washington policy-makers since the summer, when Gen Musharraf ordered the army to end the siege of Islamabad's Red Mosque, which had been seized by Islamic militants.

The fear that the country might ultimately fall into the hands of extremists led the Bush Administration to press him to restore the country to something approaching democracy, and back the return of the pro-Western former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

Pakistan, it should be remembered, is the father of the Islamic atom bomb and, given its proximity to Iran, and its murky history of co-operation on Iran's nuclear programme, the prospect of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling under the control of Islamic fundamentalists is truly alarming.

Gen Musharraf will no doubt argue that, by imposing martial law, he is curtailing the activities of Pakistan's militant Islamists, who last month caused carnage when two suicide bombers attacked Miss Bhutto's procession in Karachi, even though his primary motivation was to pre-empt a decision by Pakistan's Supreme Court on whether he could remain president for another five years.

But when Gen Musharraf first intimated to America and Britain last month that he was considering such a drastic course of action, he was told that what Washington and London really wanted to see was the return of Pakistan's democratic process, starting with the national elections scheduled for January.

A senior US official involved confirmed yesterday that the Bush Administration's disapproval of the imposition martial law was made clear when Admiral William Fallon, who runs the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, met the Pakistani president last Friday.

"Far from giving him a green light, Fallon told Musharraf that all we were interested in was the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, not the implementation of martial law," the official said. "We still expect the elections to take place in January."

If Washington is seething at Gen Musharraf's double-cross, the Administration's frustration is all the greater because there is precious little it can do to restore the status quo ante.

Immediately after the martial law declaration, there were mutterings that the State Department might withhold the billions of dollars in aid that goes to support Gen Musharraf's regime each year.

But as most of the money is used to equip the Pakistani military, such action would be self-defeating: the Administration's main priority in supporting Pakistan is to defeat the Taliban, and Washington could hardly expect Islamabad to intensify its campaign against Osama bin Laden's cohorts on the North-West Frontier while at the same time cutting its financial lifeline.

Nor is there any great confidence in the West that restoring democracy will necessarily lead to greater political stability.

Democratic government in Pakistan has a chequered history, and both Miss Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the other opposition leader who was unceremoniously deported to Saudi Arabia by Gen Musharraf on his return to Pakistan in September, had their respective terms of office as prime minister curtailed amid allegations of corruption and unbecoming constitutional conduct.

Gen Musharraf might be forgiven for thinking he was outwitted his American paymasters. But however much Washington needs the general as an ally to defeat the Islamist menace, he might still be well-advised to think twice before boarding his next flight.

The Telegraph

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/11/06/do0602.xml