by Brooke Leonard
With Kosovo’s declaration of independence looming on the horizon, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations held a timely, on-the-record discussion, “Independence in Kosovo?: Managing the Consequences.” Moderator Paul B. Stares, director of the Center, invited panelists to discuss the implications of Kosovo’s independence in the Balkan region, the ramifications of its recognition for world politics and measures that might be taken now to prevent major outbreaks of violence and fallouts in international politics. While there was little disagreement that quickly resolving Kosovo’s status will ultimately cause less bloodshed in the Balkans, a lively debate ensued about Russia’s role and how the United States should respond to Moscow’s objection to Kosovo independence without Serbia’s approval.
The failure of recent negotiations to resolve the issue of Kosovo’s status by the December 10 UN deadline has led to a consensus that the chances of coming to a decision acceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade within the UN Security Council—the best-case scenario—are virtually nonexistent. Nevertheless, many regional experts agree that the time to make a decision is now, as they view Kosovo’s independence as inevitable and hope that resolving the issue as quickly as possible will minimize the risk of long-term violence in the Balkans and allow the region to stabilize.
Daniel P. Serwer, vice president of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the U.S. Institute of Peace, subscribes to this view, noting that “the quicker, the more decisive, the less ambiguous [the decision], the better.” While not denying the risk of bloodshed following Kosovo’s imminent declaration, he stressed that failing to resolve the issue quickly could lead to the radicalization of both Serbs and Albanians, a phenomenon which could prove a much greater threat to regional peace and stability in the long run.
Serwer noted that a declaration of Kosovo’s independence coordinated between Pristina, Washington and as many EU members as possible may be the best option for containing violence in the region. The deployment of international peacekeeping forces, and particularly the presence of NATO, could reduce violence significantly and prevent further disturbances in the Balkan region. Serwer also stressed the importance of implementing the Ahtisaari plan, which calls for internationally supervised independence for Kosovo and protection of its Serb population.
Charles A. Kupchan, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, agreed that violence and instability in the region could become unmanageable if the situation continues to stall. Therefore, he said, the most pragmatic option is seeking a decision sooner rather than later. Nevertheless, he was less optimistic than Serwer about the potential for violence in the region now, particularly if Serbian-run Northern Kosovo declares its independence simultaneously. His prescriptions for preventive action included a strong and visible NATO presence, particularly in small Serbian enclaves, and cooperation between NATO, the UN and Albanian leadership to prevent Serbian and Albanian paramilitaries from operating. Kupchan did not rule out the partitioning of Kosovo, stating that although it is clearly not the ideal option, precluding it may be a mistake. A double secession, he said, would probably be the most dangerous consequence of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and partitioning the regions by design could ultimately result in much less bloodshed.
In analyzing the potential effects of Kosovo’s independence on the greater Balkan region, Janusz Bugajski, director of the New European Democracies Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed that a quick, decisive, and clear resolution backed by as many countries and multinational institutions as possible is currently the best solution. Recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Bugajski maintained, would help eliminate much of the ambiguity in the Balkans and settle relations with neighboring countries.
At the same time, Bugajski warned that Serbia’s reaction is difficult to gauge and that precautions must be taken to prevent the worst-case scenarios in the surrounding areas of Bosnia and Macedonia. With Russia’s support, Serbia could look to wreak havoc in these areas by encouraging Republika Srpska to declare its independence from Bosnia or by promoting the case for independence of the Albanian population of Macedonia. In order to prevent these provocations, Bugajski called for border treaties and a strong NATO presence in the region, in addition to sending a clear message to Belgrade that any attempts to interfere will be quickly condemned.
While discussions of Kosovo’s impending declaration of independence often focus on the immediate physical and geopolitical consequences in the Balkans, the broader ramifications of supporting Kosovo’s decision cannot be ignored. Some experts warn that it could serve as a precedent for similar declarations by other separatist regions, such as those in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Others fear that once again bypassing the UN, as NATO did during its operation in the Balkans in the 1990s, could have a grave impact on key international relationships, particularly that of the U.S. and Russia. In order to make an informed decision, the United States must answer the question: Is supporting Kosovo worth losing Russia?
Moscow has made clear that it will not support a decision on the status of Serbia’s territory made without Serbian agreement, threatening to veto any such resolution brought before the UN Security Council. As a result, the West frequently treats Russia as a bully who must be stood up to rather than worked with. According to widespread opinion, the United States and EU have a responsibility to help Kosovo and cannot allow Russia to interfere. Moscow is often dismissed as being intentionally obstinate simply to make life more difficult for the United States, as Kupchan has noted, or for having “expansionist” visions in the Balkans, as Bugajski implied, but understanding its motives and thinking strategically about the consequences of ignoring its interests is critical in preventing the further deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.
Dimitri K. Simes, president of The Nixon Center and publisher of The National Interest, noted that Russia would have no objection to Kosovo’s independence if Serbia agreed and that there is no evidence to suggest Russia has encouraged Serbia to refrain from making a deal with Kosovo. Moscow’s real interests lie in the Caucasus, where the de facto independent enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are clamoring for independence from Georgia in order to join Russia. Simes indicated that Russia probably could be persuaded to be flexible on Kosovo if there is a quid pro quo in the Caucasus.
But the United States and the EU have made clear that they consider Kosovo’s situation unique and that Kosovo’s independence does not set a precedent for other territories desiring secession. The opinion of the West, however, does not preclude these territories from treating Kosovo as such. Simes stressed the importance of thinking seriously about how our actions in the Balkans will affect global relations. What will happen, for example, if after Kosovo declares its independence, Abkhazia and South Ossetia press for their own right to sovereignty? According to Simes, there is fairly strong reason to believe that such a situation could lead to a military conflict between Georgia and Russia, which in turn would force a confrontation between Washington and Moscow.
For this reason, the United States should think twice before ignoring Russia’s objections to Kosovo’s independence without Serbian consent and refusing to be flexible in the Southern Caucasus. Simes indicated that a dispute between Washington and Moscow over Georgia could push Russia closer to Iran and possibly Venezuela. Is recognizing Kosovo’s independence worth encouraging Russia to form a coalition against the United States with such countries? Should the West be willing to accommodate Russian interests in exchange for cooperation from Moscow on key security issues? Is there a way to offer enough inducement to Belgrade, such as a combination of partition and a fast track to EU membership, to remove its opposition and eliminate the threat of a Russian veto?
The Center for Preventive Action debate was useful in posing questions such as these and not only looking at the implications of Kosovo’s independence in the Balkans, but considering the spillover effect as well. Paul Stares summed up by admitting that while he went into the discussion believing that the situation in Kosovo is fairly manageable, he left with a slightly less optimistic outlook. The bottom line is that whether one believes that Russia’s concerns should be taken into account or, as was suggested, that the country is blackmailing the West and should not be tolerated, the direction that the West takes will have consequences, and those consequences deserve significant consideration before a decision is made. If the West insists on holding its position and refuses to negotiate, it must be prepared to deal not only with the potentially destabilizing effects of Kosovo independence in the Balkans, but also the ramifications of losing Russia’s support on key areas of U.S. interest and pushing the country towards closer alliances with American adversaries.
Brooke Leonard is a staff member at The Nixon Center
Source: National Interest
http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16386
Friday, December 21, 2007
Thursday, December 20, 2007
The Kosovo Conundrum
By PETER BEINART
At first glance, the Democratic presidential front runners look like foreign policy clones. Hillary Clinton, John Edwards and Barack Obama all want to get out of Iraq. They all want to double down in Afghanistan. And they're all for a diplomatic deal with Iran. To find someone who sounds really different, you have to scroll down--past Bill Richardson, Joe Biden and Chris Dodd--all the way to Dennis Kucinich, near the rock bottom of the 2008 field.
But it's an illusion. The Democrats just look unified because the press isn't asking the right questions. It's comparing the candidates with George W. Bush--who inhabits a different ideological universe--when it should be comparing them with another world leader, Tony Blair. Viewed through that lens, the Democrats aren't so united at all. In fact, a deep foreign policy division runs through the party, not between the major campaigns but within them.
To understand it, start with Blair--not the Blair of today, but the Blair of 1999. Back then, the British leader was supporting the U.S. in a different war, in Kosovo. Remember Kosovo? It was fought without U.N. approval against a dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, who, while slaughtering his own people, posed no direct threat to the U.S. Had NATO's campaign failed, it would have been Clinton and Blair who looked like reckless ideologues. But it worked. And Blair made it the centerpiece of a new foreign policy creed, which he called the "doctrine of international community."
That vision, which Clinton largely shared, summed up Democratic foreign policy at the turn of the millennium. In a globalized world, bad things that happen in other countries spread more quickly to our shores. Genocides spawn refugees, who destabilize their neighbors. Corruption sparks financial meltdowns, which rock the world economy. Pandemics hopscotch across the globe. Blair's answer was for Britain and the U.S., working through international institutions, to intervene more aggressively in the domestic affairs of other nations: to strengthen their financial and public-health systems, to push them toward capitalism and democracy, and in cases of extreme neglect and abuse, to take over the nation-building process by force.
For much of the democratic foreign policy establishment, that's still the prism--look at Obama's push for U.N. or even NATO intervention in Darfur, or Edwards' tough talk about Vladimir Putin's rollback of democracy in Russia. Blairism, at its heart, is optimistic. It assumes that the U.S., working with its allies, can make other countries freer, healthier and richer. It assumes those countries will generally want our help. Above all, it assumes that the key to U.S. security is building a world that looks more like us. Blairism may be less militaristic than neoconservatism, but it's still a missionary creed.
Grass-roots Democrats, however--the people who will actually vote for Clinton, Edwards or Obama--are not in a missionary mood. In a June 2006 German Marshall Fund survey, only 35% of Democrats, compared with 64% of Republicans, said the U.S. should "help establish democracy in other countries." While that response was colored by Iraq, most Democrats opposed even nonmilitary efforts such as supporting dissidents and imposing political sanctions. Blairites are big fans of foreign aid. But according to a 2005 Security and Peace Institute study, only 38% of Democrats said the U.S. can afford it. (The Republican number was 20 points higher). Almost two-thirds of Democrats (compared with less than one-third of Republicans) told CBS in December, "The United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can." That's about as direct a refutation of the Blairite creed as you can get.
At the heart of anti-Blairism is a convergence between antiwar doves and realists like Virginia Senator James Webb, a former Reagan Administration official who believes the U.S. should "send American forces into harm's way only if the nation is directly threatened." Webb and his allies don't oppose all military action, but they vehemently oppose efforts to forcibly remake the world. In Iraq's wake, one of the core anti-Blairite arguments is that real internationalism means understanding what other societies want for themselves, rather than seeing them as clay waiting to be molded in the U.S.'s image.
So which vision will prevail? If a Democrat wins the White House, Blairites will claim most of the top foreign policy jobs. But without the support of people like Webb, they won't get much done. The U.S.'s interest in how other countries govern themselves hasn't changed, but our capacity to influence them has. Blairism still has a lot to recommend it, but when it comes to foreign policy, Democrats can no longer party like it's 1999.
Beinart is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Source: The Time
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1609765,00.html
At first glance, the Democratic presidential front runners look like foreign policy clones. Hillary Clinton, John Edwards and Barack Obama all want to get out of Iraq. They all want to double down in Afghanistan. And they're all for a diplomatic deal with Iran. To find someone who sounds really different, you have to scroll down--past Bill Richardson, Joe Biden and Chris Dodd--all the way to Dennis Kucinich, near the rock bottom of the 2008 field.
But it's an illusion. The Democrats just look unified because the press isn't asking the right questions. It's comparing the candidates with George W. Bush--who inhabits a different ideological universe--when it should be comparing them with another world leader, Tony Blair. Viewed through that lens, the Democrats aren't so united at all. In fact, a deep foreign policy division runs through the party, not between the major campaigns but within them.
To understand it, start with Blair--not the Blair of today, but the Blair of 1999. Back then, the British leader was supporting the U.S. in a different war, in Kosovo. Remember Kosovo? It was fought without U.N. approval against a dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, who, while slaughtering his own people, posed no direct threat to the U.S. Had NATO's campaign failed, it would have been Clinton and Blair who looked like reckless ideologues. But it worked. And Blair made it the centerpiece of a new foreign policy creed, which he called the "doctrine of international community."
That vision, which Clinton largely shared, summed up Democratic foreign policy at the turn of the millennium. In a globalized world, bad things that happen in other countries spread more quickly to our shores. Genocides spawn refugees, who destabilize their neighbors. Corruption sparks financial meltdowns, which rock the world economy. Pandemics hopscotch across the globe. Blair's answer was for Britain and the U.S., working through international institutions, to intervene more aggressively in the domestic affairs of other nations: to strengthen their financial and public-health systems, to push them toward capitalism and democracy, and in cases of extreme neglect and abuse, to take over the nation-building process by force.
For much of the democratic foreign policy establishment, that's still the prism--look at Obama's push for U.N. or even NATO intervention in Darfur, or Edwards' tough talk about Vladimir Putin's rollback of democracy in Russia. Blairism, at its heart, is optimistic. It assumes that the U.S., working with its allies, can make other countries freer, healthier and richer. It assumes those countries will generally want our help. Above all, it assumes that the key to U.S. security is building a world that looks more like us. Blairism may be less militaristic than neoconservatism, but it's still a missionary creed.
Grass-roots Democrats, however--the people who will actually vote for Clinton, Edwards or Obama--are not in a missionary mood. In a June 2006 German Marshall Fund survey, only 35% of Democrats, compared with 64% of Republicans, said the U.S. should "help establish democracy in other countries." While that response was colored by Iraq, most Democrats opposed even nonmilitary efforts such as supporting dissidents and imposing political sanctions. Blairites are big fans of foreign aid. But according to a 2005 Security and Peace Institute study, only 38% of Democrats said the U.S. can afford it. (The Republican number was 20 points higher). Almost two-thirds of Democrats (compared with less than one-third of Republicans) told CBS in December, "The United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can." That's about as direct a refutation of the Blairite creed as you can get.
At the heart of anti-Blairism is a convergence between antiwar doves and realists like Virginia Senator James Webb, a former Reagan Administration official who believes the U.S. should "send American forces into harm's way only if the nation is directly threatened." Webb and his allies don't oppose all military action, but they vehemently oppose efforts to forcibly remake the world. In Iraq's wake, one of the core anti-Blairite arguments is that real internationalism means understanding what other societies want for themselves, rather than seeing them as clay waiting to be molded in the U.S.'s image.
So which vision will prevail? If a Democrat wins the White House, Blairites will claim most of the top foreign policy jobs. But without the support of people like Webb, they won't get much done. The U.S.'s interest in how other countries govern themselves hasn't changed, but our capacity to influence them has. Blairism still has a lot to recommend it, but when it comes to foreign policy, Democrats can no longer party like it's 1999.
Beinart is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Source: The Time
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1609765,00.html
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Russia: Kosovo and the Asymmetry of Perceptions
By George Friedman
Kosovo appears to be an archaic topic. The Yugoslavian question was a 1990s issue, while the Kosovo issue has appeared to be one of those conflicts that never quite goes away but isn't regarded very seriously by the international community. You hear about it but you don't care about it. However, Kosovo is getting very serious again.
The United States and Europe appear committed to making Kosovo, now a province of Serbia, an independent state. Of course, Serbia opposes this, but more important, so does Russia. Russia opposed the original conflict, but at that point it was weak and its wishes were irrelevant. Russia opposes independence for Kosovo now, and it is far from the weak state it was in 1999 -- and is not likely to take this quietly. Kosovo's potential as a flash point between Russia and the West makes it important again. Let's therefore review the action to this point.
In 1999, NATO, led by the United States, conducted a 60-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and its main component, Serbia. The issue was the charge that Yugoslavia was sponsoring the mass murder of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, just as it had against Bosnian Muslims. The campaign aimed to force the Yugoslav army out of Kosovo while allowing a NATO force to occupy and administer the province.
Two strands led to this action. The first was the fear that the demonstrable atrocities committed by Serbs in Bosnia were being repeated in Kosovo. The second was the general feeling dominant in the 1990s that the international community's primary task was dealing with rogue states behaving in ways that violated international norms. In other words, it was assumed that there was a general international consensus on how the world should look, that the United States was the leader of this international consensus and that there was no power that could threaten the United States or the unity of the vision. There were only weak, isolated rogue states that had to be dealt with. There was no real risk attached to these operations. Yugoslavia was identified as one of those rogue states. The United States, without the United Nations but with the backing of most European countries, dealt with it.
There was no question that Serbs committed massive atrocities in Bosnia, and that Bosnians and Croats carried out massive atrocities against Serbs. These atrocities occurred in the context of Yugoslavia's explosion after the end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia had been part of an arc running from the Danube to the Hindu Kush, frozen into place by the Cold War. Muslims had been divided by the line, with some living in the former Soviet Union but most on the other side. The Yugoslav state consisted of Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims; it was communist but anti-Soviet and cooperated with the United States. It was an artificial state imposed on multiple nationalities by the victors of World War I and held in place after World War II by the force field created by U.S.-Soviet power. When the Soviets fell, the force field collapsed and Yugoslavia detonated, followed later by the rest of the arc.
The NATO mission, then, was to stabilize the western end of this arc, Yugoslavia. The strategy was to abolish the multinational state created after World War I and replace it with a series of nation-states -- such as Slovenia and Macedonia -- built around a coherent national unit. This would stabilize Yugoslavia. The problem with this plan was that each nation-state would contain substantial ethnic minorities, regardless of attempts to redraw the borders. Thus, Bosnia contains Serbs. But the theory was that small states overwhelmingly consisting of one nationality could remain stable in the face of ethnic diversity so long as there was a dominant nation -- unlike Yugoslavia, where there was no central national grouping.
So NATO decided to re-engineer the Balkans much as they were re-engineered after World War I. NATO and the United States got caught in a weird intellectual trap. On the one hand, there was an absolute consensus that the post-World War II borders of Europe were sacrosanct. If that wasn't the case, then Hungarians living in Romanian Transylvania might want to rejoin Hungary, Turkish regions of Cyprus might want to join Turkey, Germany might want to reclaim Silesia and Northern Ireland might want to secede from the United Kingdom. All hell could break loose, and one of the ways Europe avoided hell after 1945 was a cardinal rule: No borders would shift.
The re-engineering of Yugoslavia was not seen as changing borders. Rather, it was seen as eliminating a completely artificial state and freeing genuine nations to have their own states. But it was assumed that the historic borders of those states could not be changed merely because of the presence of other ethnic groups concentrated in a region. So the desire of Bosnian Serbs to join Serbia was rejected, both because of the atrocious behavior of the Bosnian Serbs and because it would have shifted the historic borders of Bosnia. If all of this seems a bit tortured, please recall the hubris of the West in the 1990s. Anything was possible, including re-engineering the land of the south Slavs, as Yugoslavia's name translates in English.
In all of this, Serbia was seen as the problem. Rather than viewing Yugoslavia as a general failed project, Serbia was seen not so much as part of the failure but as an intrinsically egregious actor that had to be treated differently than the rest, given its behavior, particularly against the Bosnians. When it appeared that the Serbs were repeating their actions in Bosnia against Albanian Muslims in 1999, the United States and other NATO allies felt they had to intervene.
In fact, the level of atrocities in Kosovo never approached what happened in Bosnia, nor what the Clinton administration said was going on before and during the war. At one point, it was said that hundreds of thousands of men were missing, and later that 10,000 had been killed and bodies were being dissolved in acid. The post-war analysis never revealed any atrocities on this order of magnitude. But that was not the point. The point was that the United States had shifted to a post-Cold War attitude, and that since there were no real threats against the United States, the primary mission of foreign policy was dealing with minor rogue states, preventing genocide and re-engineering unstable regions. People have sought explanations for the Kosovo war in vast and complex conspiracies. The fact is that the motivation was a complex web of domestic political concerns and a genuine belief that the primary mission was to improve the world.
The United States dealt with its concerns over Kosovo by conducting a 60-day bombing campaign designed to force Yugoslavia to withdraw from Kosovo and allow NATO forces in. The Yugoslav government, effectively the same as the Serbian government by then, showed remarkable resilience, and the air campaign was not nearly as effective as the air forces had hoped. The United States needed a war-ending strategy. This is where the Russians came in.
Russia was weak and ineffective, but it was Serbia's only major ally. The United States prevailed on the Russians to initiate diplomatic contacts and persuade the Serbs that their position was isolated and hopeless. The carrot was that the United State agreed that Russian peacekeeping troops would participate in Kosovo. This was crucial for the Serbians, as it seemed to guarantee the interests of Serbia in Kosovo, as well as the rights of Serbs living in Kosovo. The deal brokered by the Russians called for a withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo and entry into Kosovo of a joint NATO-Russian force, with the Russians guaranteeing that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia.
This ended the war, but the Russians were never permitted -- let alone encouraged -- to take their role in Serbia. The Russians were excluded from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) decision-making process and were isolated from NATO's main force. When Russian troops took control of the airport in Pristina in Kosovo at the end of the war, they were surrounded by NATO troops.
In effect, NATO and the United States reneged on their agreement with Russia. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry caved in the face of this reneging, leaving the Russian military -- which had ordered the Kosovo intervention -- hanging. In 1999, this was a fairly risk-free move by the West. The Russians were in no position to act.
The degree to which Yeltsin's humiliation in Kosovo led to the rise of Vladimir Putin is not fully understood. Putin represented a faction in the intelligence-military community that regarded Kosovo as the last straw. There were, of course, other important factors leading to the rise of Putin, but the Russian perception that the United States had double-crossed them in an act of supreme contempt was a significant factor. Putin came to office committed to regaining Russian intellectual influence after Yeltsin's inertia.
The current decision by the United States and some European countries to grant independence to Kosovo must be viewed in this context. First, it is the only case in Yugoslavia in which borders are to shift because of the presence of a minority. Second, it continues the policy of re-engineering Yugoslavia. Third, it proceeds without either a U.N. or NATO mandate, as an action supported by independent nations -- including the United States and Germany. Finally, it flies in the face of Russian wishes.
This last one is the critical point. The Russians clearly are concerned that this would open the door for the further redrawing of borders, paving the way for Chechen independence movements, for example. But that isn't the real issue. The real issue is that Serbia is an ally of Russia, and the Russians do not want Kosovar independence to happen. From Putin's point of view, he came to power because the West simply wouldn't take Russian wishes seriously. If there were a repeat of that display of indifference, his own authority would be seriously weakened.
Putin is rebuilding the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. He is meeting with the Belarusians over reintegration. He is warning Ukraine not to flirt with NATO membership. He is reasserting Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia. His theme is simple: Russia is near and strong; NATO is far away and weak. He is trying to define Russian power in the region. Though Kosovo is admittedly peripheral to this region, if no European power is willing to openly challenge Russian troops in Kosovo, then Russia will have succeeded in portraying NATO as a weak and unreliable force.
If the United States and some European powers can create an independent Kosovo without regard to Russian wishes, Putin's prestige in Russia and the psychological foundations of his grand strategy will suffer a huge blow. If Kosovo is granted independence outside the context of the United Nations, where Russia has veto power, he will be facing the same crisis Yeltsin did. If he repeats Yeltsin's capitulation, he will face substantial consequences. Putin and the Russians repeatedly have warned that they wouldn't accept independence for Kosovo, and that such an act would lead to an uncontrollable crisis. Thus far, the Western powers involved appear to have dismissed this. In our view, they shouldn't. It is not so much what Putin wants as the consequences for Putin if he does not act. He cannot afford to acquiesce. He will create a crisis.
Putin has two levers. One is economic. The natural gas flowing to Europe, particularly to Germany, is critical for the Europeans. Putin has a large war chest saved from high energy prices. He can live without exports longer than the Germans can live without imports. It is assumed that he wouldn't carry out this cutoff. This assumption does not take into account how important the Kosovo issue is to the Russians.
The second option is what we might call the "light military" option. Assume that Putin would send a battalion or two of troops by air to Belgrade, load them onto trucks and send them toward Pristina, claiming this as Russia's right under agreements made in 1999. Assume a squadron of Russian aircraft would be sent to Belgrade as well. A Russian naval squadron, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, already is headed to the Mediterranean. Obviously, this is not a force that could impose anything on NATO. But would the Germans, for example, be prepared to open fire on these troops?
If that happened, there are other areas of interest to Russia and the West where Russia could exert decisive military power, such as the Baltic states. If Russian troops were to enter the Baltics, would NATO rush reinforcements there to fight them? The Russian light military threat in Kosovo is that any action there could lead to a Russian reaction elsewhere.
The re-engineering of the Balkans always has assumed that there is no broader geopolitical price involved. Granting Kosovo independence would put Russia in a position in which interests that it regards as fundamental are challenged. Even if the West doesn't see why this should be the case, the Russians have made clear that it is so -- and have made statements essentially locking themselves into a response or forcing themselves to accept humiliation. Re-engineering a region where there is no risk is one thing; re-engineering a region where there is substantial risk is another.
In our view, the Russians would actually welcome a crisis. Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia is a great power. That would influence thinking throughout the former Soviet Union, sobering eastern Central Europe as well -- and Poland in particular. Confronting the West as an equal and backing it into a corner is exactly what he would like. In our view, Putin will seize the Kosovo issue not because it is of value in and of itself but because it gives him a platform to move his strategic policy forward.
The Germans have neither the resources nor the appetite for such a crisis. The Americans, bogged down in the Islamic world, are hardly in a position to deal with a crisis over Kosovo. The Russian view is that the West has not reviewed its policies in the Balkans since 1999 and has not grasped that the geopolitics of the situation have changed. Nor, in our view, has Washington or Berlin grasped that a confrontation is exactly what the Russians are looking for.
We expect the West to postpone independence again, and to keep postponing it. But the Albanians might force the issue by declaring unilateral independence. The Russians would actually be delighted to see this. But here is the basic fact: For the United States and its allies, Kosovo is a side issue of no great importance. For the Russians, it is both a hot-button issue and a strategic opportunity. The Russians won't roll over this time. And the asymmetry of perceptions is what crises are made of.
Source: Stratfor
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/gir.php
Kosovo appears to be an archaic topic. The Yugoslavian question was a 1990s issue, while the Kosovo issue has appeared to be one of those conflicts that never quite goes away but isn't regarded very seriously by the international community. You hear about it but you don't care about it. However, Kosovo is getting very serious again.
The United States and Europe appear committed to making Kosovo, now a province of Serbia, an independent state. Of course, Serbia opposes this, but more important, so does Russia. Russia opposed the original conflict, but at that point it was weak and its wishes were irrelevant. Russia opposes independence for Kosovo now, and it is far from the weak state it was in 1999 -- and is not likely to take this quietly. Kosovo's potential as a flash point between Russia and the West makes it important again. Let's therefore review the action to this point.
In 1999, NATO, led by the United States, conducted a 60-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and its main component, Serbia. The issue was the charge that Yugoslavia was sponsoring the mass murder of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, just as it had against Bosnian Muslims. The campaign aimed to force the Yugoslav army out of Kosovo while allowing a NATO force to occupy and administer the province.
Two strands led to this action. The first was the fear that the demonstrable atrocities committed by Serbs in Bosnia were being repeated in Kosovo. The second was the general feeling dominant in the 1990s that the international community's primary task was dealing with rogue states behaving in ways that violated international norms. In other words, it was assumed that there was a general international consensus on how the world should look, that the United States was the leader of this international consensus and that there was no power that could threaten the United States or the unity of the vision. There were only weak, isolated rogue states that had to be dealt with. There was no real risk attached to these operations. Yugoslavia was identified as one of those rogue states. The United States, without the United Nations but with the backing of most European countries, dealt with it.
There was no question that Serbs committed massive atrocities in Bosnia, and that Bosnians and Croats carried out massive atrocities against Serbs. These atrocities occurred in the context of Yugoslavia's explosion after the end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia had been part of an arc running from the Danube to the Hindu Kush, frozen into place by the Cold War. Muslims had been divided by the line, with some living in the former Soviet Union but most on the other side. The Yugoslav state consisted of Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims; it was communist but anti-Soviet and cooperated with the United States. It was an artificial state imposed on multiple nationalities by the victors of World War I and held in place after World War II by the force field created by U.S.-Soviet power. When the Soviets fell, the force field collapsed and Yugoslavia detonated, followed later by the rest of the arc.
The NATO mission, then, was to stabilize the western end of this arc, Yugoslavia. The strategy was to abolish the multinational state created after World War I and replace it with a series of nation-states -- such as Slovenia and Macedonia -- built around a coherent national unit. This would stabilize Yugoslavia. The problem with this plan was that each nation-state would contain substantial ethnic minorities, regardless of attempts to redraw the borders. Thus, Bosnia contains Serbs. But the theory was that small states overwhelmingly consisting of one nationality could remain stable in the face of ethnic diversity so long as there was a dominant nation -- unlike Yugoslavia, where there was no central national grouping.
So NATO decided to re-engineer the Balkans much as they were re-engineered after World War I. NATO and the United States got caught in a weird intellectual trap. On the one hand, there was an absolute consensus that the post-World War II borders of Europe were sacrosanct. If that wasn't the case, then Hungarians living in Romanian Transylvania might want to rejoin Hungary, Turkish regions of Cyprus might want to join Turkey, Germany might want to reclaim Silesia and Northern Ireland might want to secede from the United Kingdom. All hell could break loose, and one of the ways Europe avoided hell after 1945 was a cardinal rule: No borders would shift.
The re-engineering of Yugoslavia was not seen as changing borders. Rather, it was seen as eliminating a completely artificial state and freeing genuine nations to have their own states. But it was assumed that the historic borders of those states could not be changed merely because of the presence of other ethnic groups concentrated in a region. So the desire of Bosnian Serbs to join Serbia was rejected, both because of the atrocious behavior of the Bosnian Serbs and because it would have shifted the historic borders of Bosnia. If all of this seems a bit tortured, please recall the hubris of the West in the 1990s. Anything was possible, including re-engineering the land of the south Slavs, as Yugoslavia's name translates in English.
In all of this, Serbia was seen as the problem. Rather than viewing Yugoslavia as a general failed project, Serbia was seen not so much as part of the failure but as an intrinsically egregious actor that had to be treated differently than the rest, given its behavior, particularly against the Bosnians. When it appeared that the Serbs were repeating their actions in Bosnia against Albanian Muslims in 1999, the United States and other NATO allies felt they had to intervene.
In fact, the level of atrocities in Kosovo never approached what happened in Bosnia, nor what the Clinton administration said was going on before and during the war. At one point, it was said that hundreds of thousands of men were missing, and later that 10,000 had been killed and bodies were being dissolved in acid. The post-war analysis never revealed any atrocities on this order of magnitude. But that was not the point. The point was that the United States had shifted to a post-Cold War attitude, and that since there were no real threats against the United States, the primary mission of foreign policy was dealing with minor rogue states, preventing genocide and re-engineering unstable regions. People have sought explanations for the Kosovo war in vast and complex conspiracies. The fact is that the motivation was a complex web of domestic political concerns and a genuine belief that the primary mission was to improve the world.
The United States dealt with its concerns over Kosovo by conducting a 60-day bombing campaign designed to force Yugoslavia to withdraw from Kosovo and allow NATO forces in. The Yugoslav government, effectively the same as the Serbian government by then, showed remarkable resilience, and the air campaign was not nearly as effective as the air forces had hoped. The United States needed a war-ending strategy. This is where the Russians came in.
Russia was weak and ineffective, but it was Serbia's only major ally. The United States prevailed on the Russians to initiate diplomatic contacts and persuade the Serbs that their position was isolated and hopeless. The carrot was that the United State agreed that Russian peacekeeping troops would participate in Kosovo. This was crucial for the Serbians, as it seemed to guarantee the interests of Serbia in Kosovo, as well as the rights of Serbs living in Kosovo. The deal brokered by the Russians called for a withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo and entry into Kosovo of a joint NATO-Russian force, with the Russians guaranteeing that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia.
This ended the war, but the Russians were never permitted -- let alone encouraged -- to take their role in Serbia. The Russians were excluded from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) decision-making process and were isolated from NATO's main force. When Russian troops took control of the airport in Pristina in Kosovo at the end of the war, they were surrounded by NATO troops.
In effect, NATO and the United States reneged on their agreement with Russia. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry caved in the face of this reneging, leaving the Russian military -- which had ordered the Kosovo intervention -- hanging. In 1999, this was a fairly risk-free move by the West. The Russians were in no position to act.
The degree to which Yeltsin's humiliation in Kosovo led to the rise of Vladimir Putin is not fully understood. Putin represented a faction in the intelligence-military community that regarded Kosovo as the last straw. There were, of course, other important factors leading to the rise of Putin, but the Russian perception that the United States had double-crossed them in an act of supreme contempt was a significant factor. Putin came to office committed to regaining Russian intellectual influence after Yeltsin's inertia.
The current decision by the United States and some European countries to grant independence to Kosovo must be viewed in this context. First, it is the only case in Yugoslavia in which borders are to shift because of the presence of a minority. Second, it continues the policy of re-engineering Yugoslavia. Third, it proceeds without either a U.N. or NATO mandate, as an action supported by independent nations -- including the United States and Germany. Finally, it flies in the face of Russian wishes.
This last one is the critical point. The Russians clearly are concerned that this would open the door for the further redrawing of borders, paving the way for Chechen independence movements, for example. But that isn't the real issue. The real issue is that Serbia is an ally of Russia, and the Russians do not want Kosovar independence to happen. From Putin's point of view, he came to power because the West simply wouldn't take Russian wishes seriously. If there were a repeat of that display of indifference, his own authority would be seriously weakened.
Putin is rebuilding the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. He is meeting with the Belarusians over reintegration. He is warning Ukraine not to flirt with NATO membership. He is reasserting Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia. His theme is simple: Russia is near and strong; NATO is far away and weak. He is trying to define Russian power in the region. Though Kosovo is admittedly peripheral to this region, if no European power is willing to openly challenge Russian troops in Kosovo, then Russia will have succeeded in portraying NATO as a weak and unreliable force.
If the United States and some European powers can create an independent Kosovo without regard to Russian wishes, Putin's prestige in Russia and the psychological foundations of his grand strategy will suffer a huge blow. If Kosovo is granted independence outside the context of the United Nations, where Russia has veto power, he will be facing the same crisis Yeltsin did. If he repeats Yeltsin's capitulation, he will face substantial consequences. Putin and the Russians repeatedly have warned that they wouldn't accept independence for Kosovo, and that such an act would lead to an uncontrollable crisis. Thus far, the Western powers involved appear to have dismissed this. In our view, they shouldn't. It is not so much what Putin wants as the consequences for Putin if he does not act. He cannot afford to acquiesce. He will create a crisis.
Putin has two levers. One is economic. The natural gas flowing to Europe, particularly to Germany, is critical for the Europeans. Putin has a large war chest saved from high energy prices. He can live without exports longer than the Germans can live without imports. It is assumed that he wouldn't carry out this cutoff. This assumption does not take into account how important the Kosovo issue is to the Russians.
The second option is what we might call the "light military" option. Assume that Putin would send a battalion or two of troops by air to Belgrade, load them onto trucks and send them toward Pristina, claiming this as Russia's right under agreements made in 1999. Assume a squadron of Russian aircraft would be sent to Belgrade as well. A Russian naval squadron, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, already is headed to the Mediterranean. Obviously, this is not a force that could impose anything on NATO. But would the Germans, for example, be prepared to open fire on these troops?
If that happened, there are other areas of interest to Russia and the West where Russia could exert decisive military power, such as the Baltic states. If Russian troops were to enter the Baltics, would NATO rush reinforcements there to fight them? The Russian light military threat in Kosovo is that any action there could lead to a Russian reaction elsewhere.
The re-engineering of the Balkans always has assumed that there is no broader geopolitical price involved. Granting Kosovo independence would put Russia in a position in which interests that it regards as fundamental are challenged. Even if the West doesn't see why this should be the case, the Russians have made clear that it is so -- and have made statements essentially locking themselves into a response or forcing themselves to accept humiliation. Re-engineering a region where there is no risk is one thing; re-engineering a region where there is substantial risk is another.
In our view, the Russians would actually welcome a crisis. Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia is a great power. That would influence thinking throughout the former Soviet Union, sobering eastern Central Europe as well -- and Poland in particular. Confronting the West as an equal and backing it into a corner is exactly what he would like. In our view, Putin will seize the Kosovo issue not because it is of value in and of itself but because it gives him a platform to move his strategic policy forward.
The Germans have neither the resources nor the appetite for such a crisis. The Americans, bogged down in the Islamic world, are hardly in a position to deal with a crisis over Kosovo. The Russian view is that the West has not reviewed its policies in the Balkans since 1999 and has not grasped that the geopolitics of the situation have changed. Nor, in our view, has Washington or Berlin grasped that a confrontation is exactly what the Russians are looking for.
We expect the West to postpone independence again, and to keep postponing it. But the Albanians might force the issue by declaring unilateral independence. The Russians would actually be delighted to see this. But here is the basic fact: For the United States and its allies, Kosovo is a side issue of no great importance. For the Russians, it is both a hot-button issue and a strategic opportunity. The Russians won't roll over this time. And the asymmetry of perceptions is what crises are made of.
Source: Stratfor
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/gir.php
Thursday, December 6, 2007
Serbian official threatens to go to war over Kosovo
Julian Borger, diplomatic editor
Friday December 7, 2007
The EU special envoy on Kosovo yesterday demanded the retraction of a threat by a senior Serbian official that his country could resort to war if the mostly ethnic Albanian province declares independence.
Aleksandar Simic, an advisor to Serbia's prime minister, was quoted in the Belgrade media as saying that Serbia had the legal right to use war as a means of defending its territory, if Kosovo, a UN protectorate for the past eight years, declares independence in the coming weeks as expected.
"Serbia has had negative experiences from certain armed clashes during the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, and this is why we are more prudent and cautious now, but, of course, state interests are defended by war as well," Simic said.
Wolfgang Ischinger, the European member of a troika of international negotiators who have spent the past four months trying in vain to find a negotiated settlement on Kosovo's future, reacted angrily to Simic's remarks.
"I believe it is inadmissible and intolerable that even before the troika report is out one of the parties expresses himself in this way," Ischinger said in London yesterday. "I believe this is in clear violation of the firm commitments expressed by the president of Serbia himself at the conference table in a solemn fashion."
The envoy, who is also Germany's ambassador to London, said he expected the Serbian government to retract the statement.
There was no response from Belgrade last night, but a Serbian diplomat pointed to a statement on Wednesday by the foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, in which he declared his government would use all means to oppose Kosovo independence except military action in any form.
Serbia came under pressure on another front yesterday, when the outgoing war crimes investigator for the former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte, gave Belgrade until Monday to hand over a Bosnian Serb fugitive, General Ratko Mladic. Failure to do so, she said, could block Serbia's pre-membership agreement with the EU that was initialled last month, but not signed.
The row reflects rising tensions in the run-up to Monday's deadline for the last-ditch mediation effort by the troika, which also includes US and Russian envoys.
The troika report to the UN secretary general will make it clear that the mission explored every possible compromise solution without narrowing the differences between Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, and the Serbian government.
Russia, which supports Belgrade's opposition to secession and which blocked a proposal for supervised independence earlier this year, has argued that negotiations should continue after the deadline.
Ischinger said that further negotiation would not bring any convergence and would instead make the situation in the Balkans even more fragile.
"If you offer opportunities for further delays you would increase, and not necessarily decrease, security risks and risks of instability in the region," he said.
The looming Kosovo crisis will be discussed by a meeting of European foreign ministers on Monday, and at a European summit later next week before going before the security council on December 19. The newly elected Kosovo Albanian leadership has assured the EU and Washington that it will not declare independence before the meetings but an announcement could come in the new year.
"We are talking about weeks, not months," a senior western diplomat involved in the talks, said yesterday.
The US and most of western Europe is expected to recognise Kosovo's independence rapidly, but Russia has vowed to resist a secession Moscow sees as illegitimate under international law.
Source: The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331484092-103558,00.html
Friday December 7, 2007
The EU special envoy on Kosovo yesterday demanded the retraction of a threat by a senior Serbian official that his country could resort to war if the mostly ethnic Albanian province declares independence.
Aleksandar Simic, an advisor to Serbia's prime minister, was quoted in the Belgrade media as saying that Serbia had the legal right to use war as a means of defending its territory, if Kosovo, a UN protectorate for the past eight years, declares independence in the coming weeks as expected.
"Serbia has had negative experiences from certain armed clashes during the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, and this is why we are more prudent and cautious now, but, of course, state interests are defended by war as well," Simic said.
Wolfgang Ischinger, the European member of a troika of international negotiators who have spent the past four months trying in vain to find a negotiated settlement on Kosovo's future, reacted angrily to Simic's remarks.
"I believe it is inadmissible and intolerable that even before the troika report is out one of the parties expresses himself in this way," Ischinger said in London yesterday. "I believe this is in clear violation of the firm commitments expressed by the president of Serbia himself at the conference table in a solemn fashion."
The envoy, who is also Germany's ambassador to London, said he expected the Serbian government to retract the statement.
There was no response from Belgrade last night, but a Serbian diplomat pointed to a statement on Wednesday by the foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, in which he declared his government would use all means to oppose Kosovo independence except military action in any form.
Serbia came under pressure on another front yesterday, when the outgoing war crimes investigator for the former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte, gave Belgrade until Monday to hand over a Bosnian Serb fugitive, General Ratko Mladic. Failure to do so, she said, could block Serbia's pre-membership agreement with the EU that was initialled last month, but not signed.
The row reflects rising tensions in the run-up to Monday's deadline for the last-ditch mediation effort by the troika, which also includes US and Russian envoys.
The troika report to the UN secretary general will make it clear that the mission explored every possible compromise solution without narrowing the differences between Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, and the Serbian government.
Russia, which supports Belgrade's opposition to secession and which blocked a proposal for supervised independence earlier this year, has argued that negotiations should continue after the deadline.
Ischinger said that further negotiation would not bring any convergence and would instead make the situation in the Balkans even more fragile.
"If you offer opportunities for further delays you would increase, and not necessarily decrease, security risks and risks of instability in the region," he said.
The looming Kosovo crisis will be discussed by a meeting of European foreign ministers on Monday, and at a European summit later next week before going before the security council on December 19. The newly elected Kosovo Albanian leadership has assured the EU and Washington that it will not declare independence before the meetings but an announcement could come in the new year.
"We are talking about weeks, not months," a senior western diplomat involved in the talks, said yesterday.
The US and most of western Europe is expected to recognise Kosovo's independence rapidly, but Russia has vowed to resist a secession Moscow sees as illegitimate under international law.
Source: The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331484092-103558,00.html
The best answer for Kosovo is EU membership - and for Serbia too
Timothy Garton Ash
Some time in the next decade, two European countries will become members of the European Union. They will be called Serbia and Kosovo (or possibly Kosova, the spelling preferred by Kosovan Albanians). Chroniclers will note that one of these countries used to be part of the other. The Serbia that becomes a member of the European Union will be a rump Serbia, a shadow of its former self, like Austria after the first world war. This outcome will have been reached through a long vale of blood, sweat and tears. Over the next few weeks, as the issue of independence for Kosovo comes to the boil, we are certain to have more sweat and tears, but we can, with luck and good judgment on all sides, avoid the shedding of more blood.
This final outcome will not be wholly just, as in an ideal court of law. History does not work like that; it deals rough justice, at best. Innocent Serbs have suffered and died, alongside innocent Kosovan Albanians. I remember how those Kosovan Albanians laboured under the lash of Slobodan Milosevic. I have before me, as I write, my own photographs of the displaced families, the ruined houses, the blood in the snow. I talked to bereaved mothers as they shivered amid the rubble.
But I also feel the Serbian loss. Those exquisite Serbian Orthodox monasteries, the architectural gems of Decani, Gracanica and Pec, were among the first places I ever visited in the Balkans, more than 30 years ago, and they remain among the most beautiful sights on what, in a more believing age, we used to call God's earth. For all the protective arrangements in the proposed international agreements for Kosovo, they will now be islands in another country, reachable only across territory settled and controlled by what is, at least for the time being, a hostile people.
I do not know the way to draw up a historical balance-sheet that determines whether this result is just. And who, under what circumstances, has the right to self-determination is a conundrum that liberals have spent 160 years failing to resolve. But two things I will assert with confidence. First, the single human being most responsible for this Serbian loss is Slobodan Milosevic - may he rot in hell - aided and abetted by two war criminals still at large, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. I will never forget the words a melancholy monk spoke to me at the monastery of Decani, just a few days after the Nato invasion drove out Serbian forces in the summer of 1999. It was Slobodan Milosevic, said this Serbian Orthodox divine, who had "not only lost Kosovo but completely destroyed his own people, physically and spiritually".
The second thing I assert with confidence is that this will be the least worst outcome, not just for Kosovo but also for Serbia itself. Serbia has not exercised any effective sovereignty over Kosovo since the summer of 1999, with the exception of the Serb-controlled parts north of the river Ibar. In their hearts, most Serbs know that Kosovo is lost; but almost no one in Serbian politics will acknowledge that publicly. So Kosovo is a festering wound on the Serbian body politic, preventing the country's politicians, officials and journalists from concentrating on the things that really matter for the welfare of their people. Yes, this is an amputation - but sometimes, even with 21st century medical technology, it's better for the patient to have a mangled and gangrenous limb removed.
The real question now is not whether this is the right outcome but how it will be achieved. The best way forward has been blocked by the intransigence of Putin's Russia. That way - for which the UN special envoy for Kosovo, the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, and other negotiators worked so hard - would have been to get a UN security council resolution to bless the so-called Ahtisaari plan. This charts a course of supervised independence for Kosovo, with far-reaching protection and autonomy for Serbian holy places, communities and municipalities. Russia is doing no service at all to its fellow Orthodox Slavs in Serbia, or to itself, by being so bloody-minded; but bloody-minded it has been and bloody-minded it seems likely to remain following the recent Russian elections.
The worst way forward would be for the new Kosovan government, under the former Kosovo Liberation Army leader Hashim Thaci, to rush to a hasty unilateral declaration of independence - UDI. This could prompt a furious reaction from Serbian extremists and the Serbs north of the river Ibar; an angry response from the authorities in Belgrade (especially in the run-up to a presidential election), perhaps including an energy and trade blockade; not to mention possible tit-for-tat rhetoric coming out of the so-called Serb Republic in Bosnia.
The best way forward that is currently feasible, in the absence of Russian consent, is what senior negotiators are calling CDI, a coordinated declaration of independence. The new Kosovan government would move towards its cherished goal over the next three months, but in close coordination with the European Union and other international partners. Both the timing and the form would be agreed. The Albanian Kosovans would explicitly link their historic proclamation to acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan, including a new international office to supervise the running of the proto-state, a continued Nato security presence, and pledges to adopt a liberal constitution and protect minority rights. If he has sufficient courage and wisdom, Thaci will make his multi-ethnic commitment dramatically visible by saying a few generous and well-chosen words in Serbian to mark the occasion.
Though backed by the US, Nato and, so far as Russia allows, the United Nations, the European Union would take the leading role in the new arrangements - Kosovo is, after all, in Europe, not Wisconsin - and place them in the larger perspective of becoming a member state of the EU. But that perspective should not be confined to Kosovo. It must extend to the whole region.
The EU has just signed what in eurojargon is known as a "stabilisation and association agreement" with Bosnia - an important step towards eventual membership. The EU should make it crystal clear, in public diplomacy directed at the Serbian people, that it very much wants to do the same for Serbia - the day after the first of the two war criminals Karadzic and Mladic is handed over. What is more, the Kosovans should ideally be persuaded to wait until after February 3, the currently scheduled date for the second round of Serbia's presidential election, in an effort to ensure that a last emotional spasm among the Serbs does not catapult an extremist into the presidential office in Belgrade. (Serbia should not, however, be allowed to put off Kosovo's independence any longer simply by postponing the election.)
Kosovo's coordinated declaration of independence, in February 2008 at the latest, would thus be accompanied by this strong European offer to the Serbs: trade the residual shell of formal sovereignty over Kosovo for the practical chance of a better future in the EU. With their mouths, most Serbs will still say no; in their hearts, they may start to say yes.
Source: The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331470408-103558,00.html
Some time in the next decade, two European countries will become members of the European Union. They will be called Serbia and Kosovo (or possibly Kosova, the spelling preferred by Kosovan Albanians). Chroniclers will note that one of these countries used to be part of the other. The Serbia that becomes a member of the European Union will be a rump Serbia, a shadow of its former self, like Austria after the first world war. This outcome will have been reached through a long vale of blood, sweat and tears. Over the next few weeks, as the issue of independence for Kosovo comes to the boil, we are certain to have more sweat and tears, but we can, with luck and good judgment on all sides, avoid the shedding of more blood.
This final outcome will not be wholly just, as in an ideal court of law. History does not work like that; it deals rough justice, at best. Innocent Serbs have suffered and died, alongside innocent Kosovan Albanians. I remember how those Kosovan Albanians laboured under the lash of Slobodan Milosevic. I have before me, as I write, my own photographs of the displaced families, the ruined houses, the blood in the snow. I talked to bereaved mothers as they shivered amid the rubble.
But I also feel the Serbian loss. Those exquisite Serbian Orthodox monasteries, the architectural gems of Decani, Gracanica and Pec, were among the first places I ever visited in the Balkans, more than 30 years ago, and they remain among the most beautiful sights on what, in a more believing age, we used to call God's earth. For all the protective arrangements in the proposed international agreements for Kosovo, they will now be islands in another country, reachable only across territory settled and controlled by what is, at least for the time being, a hostile people.
I do not know the way to draw up a historical balance-sheet that determines whether this result is just. And who, under what circumstances, has the right to self-determination is a conundrum that liberals have spent 160 years failing to resolve. But two things I will assert with confidence. First, the single human being most responsible for this Serbian loss is Slobodan Milosevic - may he rot in hell - aided and abetted by two war criminals still at large, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. I will never forget the words a melancholy monk spoke to me at the monastery of Decani, just a few days after the Nato invasion drove out Serbian forces in the summer of 1999. It was Slobodan Milosevic, said this Serbian Orthodox divine, who had "not only lost Kosovo but completely destroyed his own people, physically and spiritually".
The second thing I assert with confidence is that this will be the least worst outcome, not just for Kosovo but also for Serbia itself. Serbia has not exercised any effective sovereignty over Kosovo since the summer of 1999, with the exception of the Serb-controlled parts north of the river Ibar. In their hearts, most Serbs know that Kosovo is lost; but almost no one in Serbian politics will acknowledge that publicly. So Kosovo is a festering wound on the Serbian body politic, preventing the country's politicians, officials and journalists from concentrating on the things that really matter for the welfare of their people. Yes, this is an amputation - but sometimes, even with 21st century medical technology, it's better for the patient to have a mangled and gangrenous limb removed.
The real question now is not whether this is the right outcome but how it will be achieved. The best way forward has been blocked by the intransigence of Putin's Russia. That way - for which the UN special envoy for Kosovo, the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, and other negotiators worked so hard - would have been to get a UN security council resolution to bless the so-called Ahtisaari plan. This charts a course of supervised independence for Kosovo, with far-reaching protection and autonomy for Serbian holy places, communities and municipalities. Russia is doing no service at all to its fellow Orthodox Slavs in Serbia, or to itself, by being so bloody-minded; but bloody-minded it has been and bloody-minded it seems likely to remain following the recent Russian elections.
The worst way forward would be for the new Kosovan government, under the former Kosovo Liberation Army leader Hashim Thaci, to rush to a hasty unilateral declaration of independence - UDI. This could prompt a furious reaction from Serbian extremists and the Serbs north of the river Ibar; an angry response from the authorities in Belgrade (especially in the run-up to a presidential election), perhaps including an energy and trade blockade; not to mention possible tit-for-tat rhetoric coming out of the so-called Serb Republic in Bosnia.
The best way forward that is currently feasible, in the absence of Russian consent, is what senior negotiators are calling CDI, a coordinated declaration of independence. The new Kosovan government would move towards its cherished goal over the next three months, but in close coordination with the European Union and other international partners. Both the timing and the form would be agreed. The Albanian Kosovans would explicitly link their historic proclamation to acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan, including a new international office to supervise the running of the proto-state, a continued Nato security presence, and pledges to adopt a liberal constitution and protect minority rights. If he has sufficient courage and wisdom, Thaci will make his multi-ethnic commitment dramatically visible by saying a few generous and well-chosen words in Serbian to mark the occasion.
Though backed by the US, Nato and, so far as Russia allows, the United Nations, the European Union would take the leading role in the new arrangements - Kosovo is, after all, in Europe, not Wisconsin - and place them in the larger perspective of becoming a member state of the EU. But that perspective should not be confined to Kosovo. It must extend to the whole region.
The EU has just signed what in eurojargon is known as a "stabilisation and association agreement" with Bosnia - an important step towards eventual membership. The EU should make it crystal clear, in public diplomacy directed at the Serbian people, that it very much wants to do the same for Serbia - the day after the first of the two war criminals Karadzic and Mladic is handed over. What is more, the Kosovans should ideally be persuaded to wait until after February 3, the currently scheduled date for the second round of Serbia's presidential election, in an effort to ensure that a last emotional spasm among the Serbs does not catapult an extremist into the presidential office in Belgrade. (Serbia should not, however, be allowed to put off Kosovo's independence any longer simply by postponing the election.)
Kosovo's coordinated declaration of independence, in February 2008 at the latest, would thus be accompanied by this strong European offer to the Serbs: trade the residual shell of formal sovereignty over Kosovo for the practical chance of a better future in the EU. With their mouths, most Serbs will still say no; in their hearts, they may start to say yes.
Source: The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331470408-103558,00.html
'They're always being told it's three months away'
Mark Tran
Thursday December 6, 2007
For a small, landlocked territory with just 2 million people, Kosovo has proved an enormous diplomatic puzzle for western policymakers - a puzzle that is about to get even more complicated.
On Monday, mediators from the EU, Russia and the US will submit their report to the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, on their efforts to resolve Kosovo's status. After almost two years of fruitless talks, the troika will report the obvious: they cannot square the circle of Kosovo's demand for independence and Serbia's formula of "more than autonomy and less than independence".
Belgrade has been trying to frighten the west with doomsday scenarios for the western Balkans should Kosovo declare unilateral independence. It warns Kosovo could be partitioned as Serbs in the north of the province break away to align themselves with Belgrade, steeling Bosnian Serbs to do the same and seek independence for a Republika Srpska in the fragile state of Bosnia.
All this may be a bluff on Belgrade's part, but a vigorous lobbying effort in European capitals by the Serbs seems to have had the desired effect, and western diplomats have become increasingly nervous of an independent Kosovo.
Serbia has ruled out overt military action, but says it will take economic measures such as cutting off electricity to a territory already suffering from regular power cuts, and imposing an economic blockade. The latter may not be very effective as goods will still be able to come into Kosovo through its borders with Montenegro and Albania. A blockade is a double-edged sword as well, because Serbia benefits from its economic ties with Kosovo.
More worrying is the threat of violence in Kosovo itself. The former US ambassador to Belgrade, William Montgomery, writing recently in the Belgrade paper Danas, warned that, in such circumstances, at least some "volunteers" - a euphemism for paramilitaries - from Serbia proper would go to "help" the Kosovo Serbs.
Belgrade pursued a similar course of action when it dispatched paramilitary thugs to Bosnia and Croatia between 1990 and 1995. Hardliners in Belgrade seem determined to make mischief in Kosovo, even if it hurts Serbia's chances of EU membership.
For once, Nato is taking a proactive stance. At Friday's meeting of Nato foreign ministers in Brussels, the US will seek a firm pledge from the alliance to maintain peacekeeping troops at the current level of 16,000 and take a tough stand against any sort of unrest.
In 2004, Nato peacekeepers were caught off-guard by riots that led to the deaths of 19 people, hundreds of injuries and the sacking of Serb churches. The Nato-led Kosovo force, Kfor, will certainly have to react with more spine this time in the case of unrest.
In the same year, a German police report said German troops hid in their barracks like "frightened rabbits". Even ahead of the Nato meeting, Nato commanders have taken the precaution of moving US and French units to northern Kosovo, 17km from the Serbian border, just in case of unrest.
In the long term however, as the former UN envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, concluded, Kosovo's status has to be resolved. The Ahtisaari plan - which would have replaced Kosovo's "quasi-state" status under UN security council resolution 1244 - envisaged supervised independence in an initial phase.
If all had gone swimmingly, as the US had confidently - but mistakenly - predicted, the UN security council would have approved the Ahtisaari blueprint and Kosvoo would now be on the path to independence. Russia, however, threw a spanner into the works and threatened to veto the plan at the UN security council.
Although the US has been loudest in its backing for Kosovo's independence, the heavy lifting will have to be done by a divided EU. Some countries with separatist problems of their own, such as Spain, Greece and Slovakia, are none too thrilled with Kosovo threatening to declare independence.
Most, however, seem to be siding with Britain's pro-independence stance. Analysts say at least 20 members of the EU now seem prepared to join the US in recognising a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians.
The EU appears to have succeeded in persuading Hasim Thaci, the former guerrilla leader who was elected prime minister of Kosovo last month, to delay any declaration of independence until February or March, in return for recognition from most EU members.
That is certainly what the Kosovo Albanians are being led to believe. Sceptics, however, say the Albanians are once again being strung along with the promise of independence. "They're always being told it's three months away," said one observer.
In the meantime, the EU will take over from the UN as the dominant civilian administration in the province and assume a more hands-on role, focusing on the rule of law, police and judicial reform and combating corruption and human trafficking. A big challenge for the EU is to coordinate the plethora of aid organisations in Kosovo - conservative assessments put the number of NGOs registered in Kosovo at 4,000.
The problem is, impatience and frustration will boil over if Kosovo's Albanians think they have been hoodwinked about independence once too often. Trading one set of international bureaucrats for another is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs, and it will not be too long before the EU will become the focus of the resentment of a restive population.
Source: The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,,2222899,00.html
Thursday December 6, 2007
For a small, landlocked territory with just 2 million people, Kosovo has proved an enormous diplomatic puzzle for western policymakers - a puzzle that is about to get even more complicated.
On Monday, mediators from the EU, Russia and the US will submit their report to the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, on their efforts to resolve Kosovo's status. After almost two years of fruitless talks, the troika will report the obvious: they cannot square the circle of Kosovo's demand for independence and Serbia's formula of "more than autonomy and less than independence".
Belgrade has been trying to frighten the west with doomsday scenarios for the western Balkans should Kosovo declare unilateral independence. It warns Kosovo could be partitioned as Serbs in the north of the province break away to align themselves with Belgrade, steeling Bosnian Serbs to do the same and seek independence for a Republika Srpska in the fragile state of Bosnia.
All this may be a bluff on Belgrade's part, but a vigorous lobbying effort in European capitals by the Serbs seems to have had the desired effect, and western diplomats have become increasingly nervous of an independent Kosovo.
Serbia has ruled out overt military action, but says it will take economic measures such as cutting off electricity to a territory already suffering from regular power cuts, and imposing an economic blockade. The latter may not be very effective as goods will still be able to come into Kosovo through its borders with Montenegro and Albania. A blockade is a double-edged sword as well, because Serbia benefits from its economic ties with Kosovo.
More worrying is the threat of violence in Kosovo itself. The former US ambassador to Belgrade, William Montgomery, writing recently in the Belgrade paper Danas, warned that, in such circumstances, at least some "volunteers" - a euphemism for paramilitaries - from Serbia proper would go to "help" the Kosovo Serbs.
Belgrade pursued a similar course of action when it dispatched paramilitary thugs to Bosnia and Croatia between 1990 and 1995. Hardliners in Belgrade seem determined to make mischief in Kosovo, even if it hurts Serbia's chances of EU membership.
For once, Nato is taking a proactive stance. At Friday's meeting of Nato foreign ministers in Brussels, the US will seek a firm pledge from the alliance to maintain peacekeeping troops at the current level of 16,000 and take a tough stand against any sort of unrest.
In 2004, Nato peacekeepers were caught off-guard by riots that led to the deaths of 19 people, hundreds of injuries and the sacking of Serb churches. The Nato-led Kosovo force, Kfor, will certainly have to react with more spine this time in the case of unrest.
In the same year, a German police report said German troops hid in their barracks like "frightened rabbits". Even ahead of the Nato meeting, Nato commanders have taken the precaution of moving US and French units to northern Kosovo, 17km from the Serbian border, just in case of unrest.
In the long term however, as the former UN envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, concluded, Kosovo's status has to be resolved. The Ahtisaari plan - which would have replaced Kosovo's "quasi-state" status under UN security council resolution 1244 - envisaged supervised independence in an initial phase.
If all had gone swimmingly, as the US had confidently - but mistakenly - predicted, the UN security council would have approved the Ahtisaari blueprint and Kosvoo would now be on the path to independence. Russia, however, threw a spanner into the works and threatened to veto the plan at the UN security council.
Although the US has been loudest in its backing for Kosovo's independence, the heavy lifting will have to be done by a divided EU. Some countries with separatist problems of their own, such as Spain, Greece and Slovakia, are none too thrilled with Kosovo threatening to declare independence.
Most, however, seem to be siding with Britain's pro-independence stance. Analysts say at least 20 members of the EU now seem prepared to join the US in recognising a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians.
The EU appears to have succeeded in persuading Hasim Thaci, the former guerrilla leader who was elected prime minister of Kosovo last month, to delay any declaration of independence until February or March, in return for recognition from most EU members.
That is certainly what the Kosovo Albanians are being led to believe. Sceptics, however, say the Albanians are once again being strung along with the promise of independence. "They're always being told it's three months away," said one observer.
In the meantime, the EU will take over from the UN as the dominant civilian administration in the province and assume a more hands-on role, focusing on the rule of law, police and judicial reform and combating corruption and human trafficking. A big challenge for the EU is to coordinate the plethora of aid organisations in Kosovo - conservative assessments put the number of NGOs registered in Kosovo at 4,000.
The problem is, impatience and frustration will boil over if Kosovo's Albanians think they have been hoodwinked about independence once too often. Trading one set of international bureaucrats for another is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs, and it will not be too long before the EU will become the focus of the resentment of a restive population.
Source: The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,,2222899,00.html
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