Four years ago, the situation in Darfur could be described in rather simple terms. Two rebel groups had launched attacks on the Sudanese military. Khartoum, fighting the last throes of the civil war with Southern Sudan, responded by arming a militia drawn from tribes with a long history of conflict with the rebels, which came to be known as the Janjaweed or "devils on horseback." The resulting militia campaign resulted in more than 200,000 dead and more than 2.5 million displaced.
Today, the genocidal campaign has mostly subsided, if only because many of the targeted tribes have fled. Yet, Darfur has descended into chaos, making it unlikely that it can be saved by the scheduled peace negotiations and expanded peacekeeping mission.
The Darfur rebel movement has splintered from two groups to more than 15, many of which are little more than armed bandits. The militias armed by the central government have turned their guns on each other, against the government, and on targets across Sudan's borders. Rebels in the countries along Darfur's borders have taken advantage of the chaos and easy access to weapons, launching campaigns against the governments in Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.). Southern Sudan, where Africa's longest civil war was ended only by turning a blind eye to the complaints of the Darfur rebels, is also gearing up for a resumption of fighting. [See: "Instability on the March in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic"]
To stop the violence, a long-delayed peacekeeping mission is preparing to enter Darfur at the end of the year, but only on the condition set by the Sudanese government that the forces are drawn solely from ill-prepared African armies. A separate, smaller U.N. peacekeeping mission may soon enter Chad and C.A.R., while the U.N. peacekeeping mission to Southern Sudan can only watch as both sides prepare for another war there. On the diplomatic side, impotent peace talks between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government were shelved for several months so that the rebels could find a common negotiating position. Having achieved the appearance of this, some rebels will negotiate with the government again later this month in Libya, the same country that two decades ago first armed, with weapons and pan-Arab ideology, the militias that would become the Janjaweed.
The conflict in Darfur is now too complex and dispersed to be resolved through the patchwork of peacekeeping missions and peace talks that have been proposed. While hopes are high in capitals around the world that this time it will be different, it seems likely that Darfur will only spread its turmoil further.
A Devolving Rebel Movement
Identity has always been complex in Darfur. The tribes that now claim to be black differ little ethnically from those that claim to be Arab. In the 1980s, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi promoted the idea of an "Arab belt" across northern Africa that led to the nomadic tribes in the region identifying themselves as Arab. Many of the tribes that formed the Janjaweed were first armed by Gadhafi when he tried to take control of Chad in 1984 and 1986. The sedentary tribes in Darfur began to adapt a black identity in the late-1980s as they saw their neglect from the Arab government in similar terms as the black tribes in Sudan's southern region. In the 1990s, these identities and the lines of conflict between Arab and black hardened as an extended drought increased the competition for resources between the nomadic and sedentary tribes.
The black rebel movement was split from the beginning between the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (S.L.M./A.) and the Justice and Equality Movement (J.E.M.). The S.L.M./A. had the backing of the Fur, the largest of the black Muslim tribes in Darfur, through the leadership of Abdul Wahid al-Nur, as well as significant backing from the Zaghawa and Masalit tribes. Led by Khalil Ibrahim, the J.E.M. was a smaller, mostly Zaghawa operation made up of Islamists who were purged from the government in 1999. The group then received backing from the Chadian government and aligned itself with a separate rebel movement in Sudan's northeast, thus receiving support from Eritrea as well. [See: "Regional Conflicts Weigh Heavily on Sudan's Future"]
On April 8, 2004, the first cease-fire agreement between the Darfur rebels and the government was signed in Chad, which allowed African Union observers into the region. The 60-man mission could only watch as the agreement was ignored by all sides, and more talks were held in Nigeria toward a final resolution. In September of that year, however, the peace talks collapsed after the rebel movements refused to sign a deal to grant greater access to refugees unless the government disarmed the Arab militias first.
The 2004 meeting in Nigeria would be the last time that the rebels would present a unified front in negotiations.
A split between Nur, who controlled the political arm of the S.L.M./A., and Minni Arcua Minnawi, who controlled the military arm of the rebel group and staged a rigged vote to gain control of the political arm, sunk the next rounds of negotiations. Then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick tried to heal the rift between the groups on November 7, 2005 in Kenya. Both groups walked out on him, and the Sudan Liberation Movement was permanently separated from the Sudan Liberation Army.
Meanwhile, the A.U. mission grew to 7,000 observers, but, confined by strict rules of engagement, this did little to stop the violence in the region. Refugee camps set up in Chad gradually grew larger and more permanent, while disaffected Chadian government and military leaders teamed up with rebels from the border area to launch a coup attempt on N'djamena. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Rebel Attack Threatens Deby's Government in Chad"]
In May 2006, Minnawi signed a peace deal with Sudan, and he officially joined the government in Khartoum. Most of Minnawi's commanders split with him when he left for Khartoum, although a small group that claims loyalty to Minnawi remains active in Darfur and recently fought with government forces during some skirmishes on October 2. Meanwhile, Nur took refuge in Eritrea, and although he continued to command great respect among the Fur and started the Non-Signatory Faction (N.S.F.) within the S.L.M., he lost most of his control over the rebel forces fighting under the S.L.M. name. Ahmed Abdel-Shafi took command of this faction, calling it S.L.M.-Classic. [See: "Intelligence Brief: New Peace Deal in Sudan Unlikely to End Darfur Conflict"]
Meanwhile, the J.E.M. was losing its financial backing. Eritrea turned its attention from Sudan to Somalia, where its arch-rival Ethiopia had launched an invasion. Chad apparently also cut off most of its funding to focus on rebels operating in its territory, and it also was in a dispute with the World Bank over oil revenues. [See: "War Clouds Loom over Somalia as Military Fronts Open Up Amid a Flurry of Diplomacy"]
In the past 16 months, the S.L.M. has splintered even further, with loose groupings like S.L.M.-Unity and Group of 19 (G19) existing as umbrella organizations for what can largely be described as groups of armed bandits. The G19 is split between the Zaghawa and Meidob tribes, and each tribal faction is further split into groups organized by powerful leaders. Abdullah Yehia and Jar el-Nabi Abdel-Karim control the largest Zaghawa rebel groups. Suleiman Marajan leads the most powerful Meidob group. Other G19 leaders have fled to Chad, such as Adam Bakheit and Khamis Abdullah Abaker, and have little power over the events in Darfur.
Ibrahim attempted to reinvigorate the J.E.M. by aligning it with some of the G19 groups. After they scored some tactical victories in 2006, disagreements over the spoils sunk the alignment. This caused some J.E.M. commanders to head out on their own. Some of these J.E.M. members have pursued closer ties with the government, while Ibrahim maintains his tougher stance. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda was ejected by Ibrahim for allegedly negotiating with Khartoum in recent weeks. In June, Ibrahim Yehia left the J.E.M. and aligned himself with the Khartoum government. Other splinter groups, such as the J.E.M.-Eastern Command, are at odds with the government and Ibrahim's rebel group.
Other rebel groups in the region only complicate matters further. The Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (S.F.D.A.) is led by Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, a former governor from the Fur tribe, but it seems to have little armed backing. The National Movement for Reform and Development (N.M.R.D.) is an off-shoot of J.E.M. led by Jibril Abdel-Karim and aligned with Zaghawa groups backed by the Chadian president. However, it also has little influence on the ground in Darfur. Some other new groups include the Popular Forces Troops and Sudan Democratic Group. It is doubtful that these groups have any popular backing.
In part, the fracturing of the rebel groups has been encouraged by Khartoum since 2005, when it started entering into negotiations with deputies and commanders of small factions who did not have permission to negotiate on behalf of the rebel groups. These deputies often seek financial profit in return for signing agreements that Khartoum can use as evidence of its commitment to the peace process.
In the run-up to this month's peace talks, the fighting in Darfur has increased. The S.L.M.-Unity appears to have aligned with the core remnants of the J.E.M. in southeast Darfur. The rebel groups staged attacks on government forces in Wad Banda and Adila in August. In each attack, the groups briefly held the town and took weapons and supplies before government troops arrived. The attack on Wad Banda was particularly notable because it was the largest rebel incursion into Kordofan province, which is outside of the Darfur region. Despite this alliance, the rebel groups are still losing commanders who have gone on to form their own groups. It appears that these new groups have turned on the A.U. peacekeepers in the region.
On September 29, the rebels stormed an A.U. base in Haskanita, a town in northern Darfur, killing at least 10 A.U. troops, with as many as 50 troops missing. Haskanita is a strategic location in Darfur, as it is a major rebel stronghold. There is a J.E.M.-S.L.M.-Unity base there, where the government launched a raid in August that appeared to target Ibrahim. The rebels repelled the attack, though they were greatly damaged. Haskanita was bombed by the Sudanese air force in early September during another attempt by the government to retake the town, which was also repelled at great costs to both sides. One theory for the attack on the A.U. is that the rebels in the region began to view the peacekeepers as their enemy because they did nothing to prevent the Sudanese military's attacks on Haskanita, which had killed many civilians. However, J.E.M. and S.L.M.-Unity both deny taking part in the attack on the A.U. base.
It was not clear who initiated the strike on the small A.U. base in Haskanita, but early reports indicate that it was led by commanders from S.L.M.-Unity and possibly J.E.M. who are looking to gain a seat at the peace talks in Libya. However, the scale of the raid seems to indicate that it may have been more than just a new splinter group, although the evidence is scant. In fact, J.E.M. accused Khartoum of staging the attack to sink the upcoming peace talks, but also cited no evidence of this. If it is demonstrated that the J.E.M.-S.L.M.-Unity forces in Haskanita launched the attack, it will be a devastating blow to the rebel cause in the eyes of their Western supporters.
Nevertheless, attacks like this have become more common as the rebels have dissolved into smaller and smaller groups, often resorting to banditry to support themselves. In April, a rebel group attacked A.U. troops, killing five Senegalese troops. Again, no group took responsibility, but reports indicate that it was a splinter group of the S.L.A., this time probably from the G19. The latest attack has rattled nerves in some African capitals, leading Senegal to speculate that it might pull its troops out of Darfur ahead of the expanded peacekeeping mission.
Splits Within the Arab Militias
Although not part of the peace negotiations, fractures among the Arab tribes that form the bulk of the Janjaweed have added even more complications to the Darfur situation. Violence between the Arab tribes in Darfur has been common at low levels for much of the region's history and had little influence on fighting between the rebels and the Janjaweed. However, in the past several months, the level of violence has increased and the militias that formed the Janjaweed appear to be turning on each other.
From the beginning of the current situation in Darfur, the tribes from which the Janjaweed drew its forces denied any responsibility for the violence, and the leaders of the Arab militias that came to be known as the Janjaweed denied their culpability. Musa Hilal, widely considered the top Janjaweed leader, denied in many media interviews that the Janjaweed even existed. In a narrow sense, this was true -- the Janjaweed was never a tightly run group, but rather a loose alliance with Hilal's troops, who worked closely with the government.
The Rizigat tribe is the largest contributor to the Janjaweed forces, though not all of its clans have participated in the fighting. The Rizigat are made up of the Abala and Baggara tribes, among other smaller groups. The Abala are made up of many large clans, including the Mahria from where most of the Janjaweed militias derive. The Baggara, for the most part, have stayed out of the fighting. Their leader, Saeed Madibo, has maintained a stance of neutrality in the conflict, although reports indicate that some Baggara have joined with the Janjaweed forces.
With large portions of the black tribes in refugee camps across the border in Chad, the tribes armed by the Sudanese government have begun to fight each other for control of the territory. This is further complicated by the arrival of Arab tribes fleeing violence in Chad. Clashes between Mahria and Terjem clans broke out at the end of July. The Mahria easily routed the Terjem in the battles, but more clashes can be expected. To the south, the Habanniya and the Salamat have also clashed. Arab tribes that did not join the Janjaweed, like the Hotia, have proven particularly vulnerable in this cycle.
Another development has been the formation of Arab groups that have taken up arms against the government. The United Revolutionary Force Front (U.R.F.F.) claimed it took 12 Sudanese soldiers hostage in August. The U.R.F.F. emerged from the Democratic Popular Front Army (D.P.F.A.), an Arab militia formed in 2004 to fight against the government. Until recently, the militia has avoided large-scale confrontations with government forces in the region, but the D.P.F.A. may be stepping up the pressure in the hopes of gaining a seat at peace talks in the future.
Another group that attempted to bring Arab concerns to the peace talks was the Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces (R.D.F.F.), led by Abdel-Rahman Musa, a Rizeigat Arab of the Baggara tribe. It was formed to bring the black rebel groups together with the Arab tribes, but it seems to have only left Musa without backing from either.
The violence between the Arab tribes, and the launch of Arab-led attacks on government forces, will make it more difficult for the current peace process to bring stability to Darfur. None of the Arab tribes are represented in the peace negotiations, and it is unlikely that the armed groups will give up their weapons should Khartoum sign a deal with the black rebels. Of course, this will only matter if the current negotiations succeed, which seems unlikely.
Can the Rebels Regroup?
The main question heading into the peace talks is whether the representatives of the Darfur rebels will be able to present a unified position. Another, perhaps more important, concern is whether anybody present will actually represent the groups still fighting in Darfur.
After several attempts to bring the rebel groups together failed, the international donor community requested that the rebels agree to a unified position before the expanded U.N. peacekeeping mission begins. In early August, several rebel leaders gathered in Tanzania to work toward such an agreement. Notably absent was Nur, who had taken up residence in Paris and refused to talk until the peacekeeping mission was in place.
Under great pressure, the delegates agreed to a common position on power-sharing in the next round of talks with the government. However, it is not clear how much influence the leaders in attendance have over the rebel groups operating in Darfur. Most of the leaders who showed up in Tanzania represented groups that barely exist outside of meetings sponsored by foreign donors, such as S.F.D.A. and N.M.R.D. Since August, some of the J.E.M. leaders and many of the G19 have backed away from their pledges of a common position and have said that they will not attend the peace talks in Libya.
During the Tanzania talks, the international community pressured Khartoum to release Suleiman Jamous from its custody. Jamous claimed to be the humanitarian coordinator for the S.L.M./A. when he was taken to a U.N. hospital in Kadugli for treatment and where he was then held against his will by the Sudanese government last year. Western donors flocked to his story, and held him up as a potential unifying figure for the rebel movement. When Khartoum finally allowed him to leave the hospital after 15 months in September, it was clear that Jamous had already lost whatever influence he once had over the rebels. It is unclear if he will attend the peace talks in Libya, as he appears intent on traveling to Europe to seek medical care after having denied treatment in two U.N. hospitals in Africa.
Conclusion
Heading into the peace talks scheduled for October 27 in Libya, the outcome remains uncertain. Although some sort of peace agreement may be signed, it seems unlikely that it will have much effect on the rapidly evolving chaos of Darfur. The meeting will lack some of the most important rebel leaders, and many of those present seem only eager to take the wealth and job titles that signing a deal can provide. They look to the example of Minni Arcua Minnawi, who signed a deal with Khartoum in 2006 in return for a well-paid position in the central government, but left most of his troops fighting in Darfur.
Other rebel groups seem to be escalating their attacks in order to gain a seat at the table. Commanders who left J.E.M. and the S.L.A.-Classic have formed their own groups and have resorted to banditry to gain the power necessary to get an invitation to the peace talks. The September 29 attack on African Union peacekeepers in Haskanita was the most dramatic example of this trend.
Notably absent from the negotiations will be Darfur's Arabs. Those that have been armed by the government are not likely to allow their weapons to be taken away without a seat at the table. Other Arab groups who oppose the government have already begun escalating their fight in the hopes of entering the talks, and fighting within the Arab community will not be addressed in Libya.
Another reason for pessimism ahead of the talks is due to their location. Libya has been an active meddler in the Darfur conflict, as well as in the violence in Chad. Many of the rebels, particularly those groups that come from J.E.M., have close ties to the Zaghawa tribes that defeated the Libyan incursions, which has left them skeptical of their host's intentions. The host, Moammar Gadhafi, was the first to arm the Arab militias that would become the Janjaweed, although he has since turned away from his notion of a pan-Arab belt across northern Africa. Gadhafi abandoned this goal after being shunned by the major Middle Eastern powers and has since turned his attention to Africa. His proposals for a unified Africa have also failed to get off the ground, and he is hoping to use his role in the Darfur conflict to gain leverage across the continent. Because of this, few at the table will trust Gadhafi's motivations and his presence will only add another barrier to agreement.
Even if the flawed peace talks were to end with a deal, the instability surrounding Darfur would probably be enough to sink any hopes of a lasting peace. A weak patchwork of bilateral peace deals and separate U.N. peacekeeping missions is unlikely to hold in a region where many of the conflicts are intertwined. Each agreement will be inherently weak, and each peacekeeping mission will be given narrow rules of engagement, leaving many opportunities for new rebel groups to stir up trouble.
Report Drafted By:
Adam Wolfe
Source: Power and Interest News Report
http://www.pinr.com/
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