Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Pakistan Faces a Divide of Age on Muslim Law
By CARLOTTA GALL
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Cheering crowds have gathered in recent days to support the assassin who riddled the governor of Punjab with 26 bullets and to praise his attack — carried out in the name of the Prophet Muhammad — as an act of heroism. To the surprise of many, chief among them have been Pakistan’s young lawyers, once seen as a force for democracy.
Their energetic campaign on behalf of the killer has caught the government flat-footed and dismayed friends and supporters of the slain politician, Salman Taseer, an outspoken proponent of liberalism who had challenged the nation’s strict blasphemy laws. It has also confused many in the broader public and observers abroad, who expected to see a firm state prosecution of the assassin.
Instead, before his court appearances, the lawyers showered rose petals over the confessed killer, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, a member of an elite police group who had been assigned to guard the governor, but who instead turned his gun on him. They have now enthusiastically taken up his defense.
It may seem a stark turnabout for a group that just a few years ago looked like the vanguard of a democracy movement. They waged months of protests in 2007 and 2008 to challenge Pakistan’s military dictator after he unlawfully removed the chief justice.
But the lawyers’ stance is perhaps just the most glaring expression of what has become a deep generational divide tearing at the fabric of Pakistani society, and of the broad influence of religious conservatism — and even militancy — that now exists among the educated middle class.
They are often described as the Zia generation: Pakistanis who have come of age since the 1980s, when the military dictator, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, began to promote Islam in public education and to use it as a political tool to unify this young and insecure nation.
Today, the forces he set loose have gained such strength that they threaten to overwhelm voices for tolerance in Pakistan’s feeble civilian government. They certainly present a nagging challenge for the United States.
Washington has poured billions of dollars into the Pakistani military to combat terrorism, but has long neglected a civilian effort to counter the inexorable pull of conservative Islam. By now the conservatives have entered nearly every part of Pakistani society, even the rank-and-file security forces, as the assassination showed. The military, in fact, has been conspicuously silent about the killing.
“Over time, Pakistani society has drifted toward religious extremism,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a political and defense analyst from Lahore. “This religious sentiment has seeped deep into government circles and into the army and police at lower levels.”
“The lower level are listening to the religious people,” he said.
Indeed, the Pakistan of today, and the brand of Islam much of the nation has embraced, is barely recognizable even to many educated Pakistanis older than the Zia generation. Among them is Athar Minallah, 49, a former cabinet minister and one of the leaders of the lawyers’ protest campaign against Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 2007 and 2008.
Mr. Minallah studied law at Islamic University in Islamabad from 1983 to 1986, and the first lesson any student learned in his day was that the preservation of life was a pillar of Islamic law, he said.
But under General Zia in the 1980s, the government began supporting Islamic warriors to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Indian control of Kashmir, and the syllabus was changed to encourage jihad. The mind-set of students and graduates changed along with it, Mr. Minallah said.
That change is now no more apparent than among the 1,000 lawyers from the capital, Islamabad, and the neighboring city of Rawalpindi, who have given their signed support for the defense of Mr. Qadri, who has been charged with murder and terrorism.
Their leader is Rao Abdur Raheem, 30, who formed a “lawyers’ forum,” called the Movement to Protect the Dignity of the Prophet, in December. The aim of the group, he said, was to counter Mr. Taseer’s campaign to amend the nation’s strict blasphemy laws, which promise death for insulting the Prophet Muhammad.
In interviews, Mr. Raheem and six of his colleagues insisted they were not members of any political or religious party, and were acting independently and interested only in ensuring the rule of law.
All graduates of different Pakistani universities, they insisted they were liberal, not religious conservatives. Only one had religious training. They said they had all taken part in the lawyers’ protest campaign in 2007 and 2008, and that they were proud that the movement helped reinstate the chief justice.
Yet they forcefully defended Mr. Qadri, saying he had acted on his own, out of strong religious feeling, and they denied that he had told his fellow guards of his plans in advance. He was innocent until proved guilty, they said. They have already succeeded in preventing the government from changing the court venue.
In their deep religious conviction, and in their energy and commitment to the cause of the blasphemy laws, they are miles apart from the older generation of lawyers and law enforcement officials above them.
“I felt this is a different society,” said one former law enforcement official when he saw the lawyers celebrating Mr. Qadri. “There is a disconnect in society.”
The former security official, who has worked in fighting militancy and who requested anonymity because of his work, said that within just four hours of the killing, 2,500 people had posted messages supporting Mr. Qadri on Facebook pages.
Mass rallies championing him and the blasphemy laws have continued since then.
This conservatism is fueled by an element of class divide, between the more secular and wealthy upper classes and the more religious middle and lower classes, said Najam Sethi, a former editor of The Daily Times, a liberal daily newspaper published by Mr. Taseer. As Pakistan’s middle class has grown, so has the conservative population.
Besides his campaign against the blasphemy laws, it was Mr. Taseer’s wealth and secular lifestyle that made him a target for the religious parties, Mr. Sethi said.
“Salman had an easygoing, witty, irreverent, high-life style,” he said, “so the anger of class inequality mixed with religious passion gives a heady, dangerous brew.”
Government officials, analysts and members of the Pakistan Peoples Party, the secular-leaning party to which Mr. Taseer belonged, blame the religious parties and clerics who delivered speeches and fatwas against Mr. Taseer for inciting the attack. On Monday, Mr. Qadri, who confessed to the killing, provided a court with testimony saying he was inspired by two clerics, Qari Hanif and Ishtiaq Shah.
The police say they are now seeking the clerics for questioning, but with the growing strength of the conservative movement on the streets, religious leaders — even those who incite violence and terrorism — are nearly untouchable to the authorities and are almost never prosecuted.
The blasphemy law has been condemned by human rights groups here, who say it has been used to persecute religious minorities, like Christians, and on Monday, Pope Benedict XVI called on Pakistan to undo the law. But the law has become an opportunity for religious parties looking to whip up public sentiment, Mr. Sethi said.
A dark presence in the background is the military establishment, which has sponsored the religious parties for decades, using them as tools to influence politics and as militant proxies abroad. The military also has a heavy influence on much of Pakistan’s brash media, which fanned the flames of the blasphemy issue with sensationalist coverage.
“Democracy has brought us a media that is extremely right-wing, conservative,” Mr. Sethi, 62, said. “Most are in their 30s and are a product of the Zia years, of the textbooks and schools set by the Zia years, which are not the sort of things that we were taught.”
“The silence of the armed forces is ominous,” Mr. Sethi added.
Indeed, whether on the military or civilian side, the government has failed to act forcefully on the case at every stage, the former security official said. Whether through fear or lack of policy, it has done little to challenge the ideology behind the attack or the spreading radicalism in Pakistani society.
“The entire state effort has been on the capture and kill approach: how many terrorists can you arrest and how many can you kill,” the former security official said. “Nothing has been done about the breeding ground of extremism.
“Unless the government does something serious and sustained,” the official warned, “we are on a very dangerous trajectory.”
Salman Masood contributed reporting from Islamabad, and Waqar Gillani from Lahore, Pakistan.
N.Y.T
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/world/asia/11pakistan.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha22
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Cheering crowds have gathered in recent days to support the assassin who riddled the governor of Punjab with 26 bullets and to praise his attack — carried out in the name of the Prophet Muhammad — as an act of heroism. To the surprise of many, chief among them have been Pakistan’s young lawyers, once seen as a force for democracy.
Their energetic campaign on behalf of the killer has caught the government flat-footed and dismayed friends and supporters of the slain politician, Salman Taseer, an outspoken proponent of liberalism who had challenged the nation’s strict blasphemy laws. It has also confused many in the broader public and observers abroad, who expected to see a firm state prosecution of the assassin.
Instead, before his court appearances, the lawyers showered rose petals over the confessed killer, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, a member of an elite police group who had been assigned to guard the governor, but who instead turned his gun on him. They have now enthusiastically taken up his defense.
It may seem a stark turnabout for a group that just a few years ago looked like the vanguard of a democracy movement. They waged months of protests in 2007 and 2008 to challenge Pakistan’s military dictator after he unlawfully removed the chief justice.
But the lawyers’ stance is perhaps just the most glaring expression of what has become a deep generational divide tearing at the fabric of Pakistani society, and of the broad influence of religious conservatism — and even militancy — that now exists among the educated middle class.
They are often described as the Zia generation: Pakistanis who have come of age since the 1980s, when the military dictator, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, began to promote Islam in public education and to use it as a political tool to unify this young and insecure nation.
Today, the forces he set loose have gained such strength that they threaten to overwhelm voices for tolerance in Pakistan’s feeble civilian government. They certainly present a nagging challenge for the United States.
Washington has poured billions of dollars into the Pakistani military to combat terrorism, but has long neglected a civilian effort to counter the inexorable pull of conservative Islam. By now the conservatives have entered nearly every part of Pakistani society, even the rank-and-file security forces, as the assassination showed. The military, in fact, has been conspicuously silent about the killing.
“Over time, Pakistani society has drifted toward religious extremism,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a political and defense analyst from Lahore. “This religious sentiment has seeped deep into government circles and into the army and police at lower levels.”
“The lower level are listening to the religious people,” he said.
Indeed, the Pakistan of today, and the brand of Islam much of the nation has embraced, is barely recognizable even to many educated Pakistanis older than the Zia generation. Among them is Athar Minallah, 49, a former cabinet minister and one of the leaders of the lawyers’ protest campaign against Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 2007 and 2008.
Mr. Minallah studied law at Islamic University in Islamabad from 1983 to 1986, and the first lesson any student learned in his day was that the preservation of life was a pillar of Islamic law, he said.
But under General Zia in the 1980s, the government began supporting Islamic warriors to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Indian control of Kashmir, and the syllabus was changed to encourage jihad. The mind-set of students and graduates changed along with it, Mr. Minallah said.
That change is now no more apparent than among the 1,000 lawyers from the capital, Islamabad, and the neighboring city of Rawalpindi, who have given their signed support for the defense of Mr. Qadri, who has been charged with murder and terrorism.
Their leader is Rao Abdur Raheem, 30, who formed a “lawyers’ forum,” called the Movement to Protect the Dignity of the Prophet, in December. The aim of the group, he said, was to counter Mr. Taseer’s campaign to amend the nation’s strict blasphemy laws, which promise death for insulting the Prophet Muhammad.
In interviews, Mr. Raheem and six of his colleagues insisted they were not members of any political or religious party, and were acting independently and interested only in ensuring the rule of law.
All graduates of different Pakistani universities, they insisted they were liberal, not religious conservatives. Only one had religious training. They said they had all taken part in the lawyers’ protest campaign in 2007 and 2008, and that they were proud that the movement helped reinstate the chief justice.
Yet they forcefully defended Mr. Qadri, saying he had acted on his own, out of strong religious feeling, and they denied that he had told his fellow guards of his plans in advance. He was innocent until proved guilty, they said. They have already succeeded in preventing the government from changing the court venue.
In their deep religious conviction, and in their energy and commitment to the cause of the blasphemy laws, they are miles apart from the older generation of lawyers and law enforcement officials above them.
“I felt this is a different society,” said one former law enforcement official when he saw the lawyers celebrating Mr. Qadri. “There is a disconnect in society.”
The former security official, who has worked in fighting militancy and who requested anonymity because of his work, said that within just four hours of the killing, 2,500 people had posted messages supporting Mr. Qadri on Facebook pages.
Mass rallies championing him and the blasphemy laws have continued since then.
This conservatism is fueled by an element of class divide, between the more secular and wealthy upper classes and the more religious middle and lower classes, said Najam Sethi, a former editor of The Daily Times, a liberal daily newspaper published by Mr. Taseer. As Pakistan’s middle class has grown, so has the conservative population.
Besides his campaign against the blasphemy laws, it was Mr. Taseer’s wealth and secular lifestyle that made him a target for the religious parties, Mr. Sethi said.
“Salman had an easygoing, witty, irreverent, high-life style,” he said, “so the anger of class inequality mixed with religious passion gives a heady, dangerous brew.”
Government officials, analysts and members of the Pakistan Peoples Party, the secular-leaning party to which Mr. Taseer belonged, blame the religious parties and clerics who delivered speeches and fatwas against Mr. Taseer for inciting the attack. On Monday, Mr. Qadri, who confessed to the killing, provided a court with testimony saying he was inspired by two clerics, Qari Hanif and Ishtiaq Shah.
The police say they are now seeking the clerics for questioning, but with the growing strength of the conservative movement on the streets, religious leaders — even those who incite violence and terrorism — are nearly untouchable to the authorities and are almost never prosecuted.
The blasphemy law has been condemned by human rights groups here, who say it has been used to persecute religious minorities, like Christians, and on Monday, Pope Benedict XVI called on Pakistan to undo the law. But the law has become an opportunity for religious parties looking to whip up public sentiment, Mr. Sethi said.
A dark presence in the background is the military establishment, which has sponsored the religious parties for decades, using them as tools to influence politics and as militant proxies abroad. The military also has a heavy influence on much of Pakistan’s brash media, which fanned the flames of the blasphemy issue with sensationalist coverage.
“Democracy has brought us a media that is extremely right-wing, conservative,” Mr. Sethi, 62, said. “Most are in their 30s and are a product of the Zia years, of the textbooks and schools set by the Zia years, which are not the sort of things that we were taught.”
“The silence of the armed forces is ominous,” Mr. Sethi added.
Indeed, whether on the military or civilian side, the government has failed to act forcefully on the case at every stage, the former security official said. Whether through fear or lack of policy, it has done little to challenge the ideology behind the attack or the spreading radicalism in Pakistani society.
“The entire state effort has been on the capture and kill approach: how many terrorists can you arrest and how many can you kill,” the former security official said. “Nothing has been done about the breeding ground of extremism.
“Unless the government does something serious and sustained,” the official warned, “we are on a very dangerous trajectory.”
Salman Masood contributed reporting from Islamabad, and Waqar Gillani from Lahore, Pakistan.
N.Y.T
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/world/asia/11pakistan.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha22
Strategic Comments: South Asia still beset by violent extremism
As a major focus of jihadist activity, threatening not just the states of the region but also Europe and increasingly the United States, South Asia has endured high levels of violent extremism over the past year. The assassination of the governor of Pakistan's Punjab province in January 2011 revealed growing support in that country for radical views. While India recorded counter-terrorism successes, the key to regional stability is the India–Pakistan relationship, which remains tense. In 2010 US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of a 'syndicate' of terrorist groups, operating under the umbrella of al-Qaeda and working to destabilise South Asia by provoking a war between India and Pakistan. The evidence is unclear, but relationships between militant groups do appear to have grown closer. And while improved regional intelligence cooperation has begun to have an impact on the activities of jihadists, it is still in its infancy.
India: ISI moratorium brings relative calm
India to some extent bucked the regional trend with only one major act of jihadist violence during 2010 (though it was still plagued by high levels of Naxalite violence in the north, and there were renewed troubles in Kashmir). This was a bomb attack in February in Pune on a bakery popular with foreign visitors, which killed 17 people. Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT), the Pakistan-based group behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks, claimed responsibility. But a much-anticipated spate of attacks in the run-up to the Commonwealth Games, held in Delhi in October, did not materialise. This may reflect an improved performance on the part of India's security and intelligence agencies, aided by much-enhanced levels of US assistance, with 13 jihadist plots having been disrupted during the course of the year. It may also reflect efforts on the part of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to discourage further anti-Indian activity by LeT.
Interrogations by the US and India of David Coleman Headley (also known as Daoud Gilani), a US national of part-Pakistani parentage arrested by the FBI in late 2009, have offered important insights into the origins of the Mumbai attacks, in particular the extent of Pakistani official complicity. Headley had been involved in extensive reconnaissance of Mumbai targets on behalf of LeT and has told his interrogators that, at an operational level, ISI had advance knowledge of the operation.
According to Headley, who has pleaded guilty to the charges against him and is cooperating with the FBI, the ISI had seen the Mumbai attacks as a means of restoring the jihadist credentials of LeT. Many of LeT's members, frustrated by the restrictions imposed on them by ISI, had been leaving to join more extreme Pakistani jihadist groups which, in contrast to LeT, had turned against the Pakistani state. However, Headley's account suggests that the top leadership of ISI were not aware of the operation, indicating that ISI's command structure may be less efficient than has been supposed. According to Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, the ISI's chief, Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, admitted to then-CIA Director Mike Hayden that at least two retired Pakistani Army officers had been involved in planning the Mumbai attack. This is hardly reassuring given that ISI's 'S Wing', the department responsible for relations with jihadist groups and for operations outside Pakistan, is known to consist solely of retired military officers so that the government can deny responsibility for its actions. Shuja Pasha reportedly told Hayden: 'It was rogue … There may have been people associated with my organisation who were associated with this. That's different from authority, direction and control'.
The wealth of detail that has emerged about the Mumbai operation may have created pressure on ISI to impose a tighter moratorium on further such operations – though in late December 2010 the Indian government issued an alert relating to threats from LeT elements which had supposedly already infiltrated the country.
However, LeT does not appear to have been involved in an increase in violence in Kashmir, which for some years had been in an uneasy state of relative calm guaranteed by a pervasive Indian security presence. In June 2010 the death of a teenager in one of a series of stone-throwing confrontations with security forces led to rioting, which brought the Indian army out of their barracks and onto the streets. A curfew was reimposed. Although Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram initially accused LeT of fomenting unrest, the government has since acknowledged that the violence, which resulted in more than 60 civilian deaths, was in effect a popular uprising with no structure or leadership. The real causes of the unrest are both political and economic – an unrequited desire for independence and frustration with heavy security measures and alleged human-rights abuses, coupled with high levels of youth unemployment. The Indian government has partially acknowledged the validity of some grievances and has sought to minimise the use of force in controlling demonstrations.
Afghanistan: the key link
One reason for the relative lack of jihadist activity inside India may be that jihadism has moved westward, with many Pakistani extremist groups now increasingly focusing their efforts either on operations inside Afghanistan or against the Pakistani state, both in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or the settled areas, including Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
This shift is part of a complex series of moves in anticipation of an endgame in Afghanistan, which is widely expected at some point to involve a negotiation between the Afghan government and the main insurgent groups. Pakistan has sought to insert itself into any such negotiation by manipulating its relationships with some key jihadist groups: the Afghan Taliban, also known as the 'Quetta Shura'; the Haqqani network; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami; as well as LeT. According to General Michael T. Flynn, the senior US military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, LeT operatives are coming to Afghanistan in increasing numbers to gain combat experience and are active in eight Afghan provinces. Much of the focus of these groups, in particular the Haqqani network, has been on countering an Indian presence in Afghanistan which represents a constant source of strategic concern for Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistani politicians have begun to talk about the resolution of the Afghan conflict as more important than Kashmir in terms of defining their country's relations with India.
Pakistan's ultimate aim is a reasonably stable Afghanistan not inimical to Pakistan and in which Indian influence is limited to a point where it presents no strategic threat. Pakistani political leaders appear to have modified their position to a point where they talk publicly of not wishing to 'repeat the mistakes of the 1990s' – a reference to Pakistan's role in enabling the Taliban to assume power in 1996. Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani has been increasingly open in discussing with US counterparts Pakistan's interests and ability to help achieve a negotiated settlement. At the same time, Pakistan has shown itself ready to act forcefully to ensure a seat at the negotiating table for itself, as demonstrated by its arrests of a number of high-ranking members of the Quetta Shura – including Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – who were suspected of pursuing negotiations with the Afghan government independently of Pakistan.
Referring to it as a 'national interest', Pakistan has also been more ready to acknowledge the nature of its relationship with the Haqqani network, an organisation with close links to al-Qaeda that has been at the forefront of attacks against both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Indian interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan's increasingly thinly disguised support for the Haqqani network represents a source of increasing frustration to ISAF commanders, who have determined until now that hot-pursuit operations inside Pakistani territory would prove counterproductive. The nearest ISAF has come to such operations was in September 2010 when US forces killed two Pakistani border guards who were providing covering fire for Haqqani fighters escaping back from Afghanistan into Pakistan. This incident led Pakistan temporarily to close the Torkham Gate border crossing in Khyber Agency through which 1,000 trucks, carrying 25% of ISAF non-lethal supplies, cross each day into Afghanistan, and served as a reminder of ISAF's dependence on Pakistan's goodwill.
Lashkar al-Zil: alliance of jihadist groups
Meanwhile, links between a variety of jihadi groups spanning both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border appear to have grown closer. In 2009, ISAF sources in Afghanistan began to talk of the emergence of a new umbrella group, known as 'Lashkar al-Zil' – Shadow Army – comprising al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has been waging war against the Pakistani state in Pakistan's tribal areas and Swat. The commander of Lashkar al-Zil is reported to be Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior commander in the Pakistani jihadist group Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), who is also thought to have replaced Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, killed in a CIA drone strike in May 2010, as al-Qaeda's military chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kashmiri has also been identified as the driving force behind a number of recent al-Qaeda plots aimed at Western European targets.
Characterised as a replacement for al-Qaeda's Afghan-based guerrillas known as 'Brigade 055', it is far from clear how structured this new entity is. But ISAF commanders have cited evidence of increasing collaboration between jihadist groups which until recently had pursued their own agendas. Meanwhile, senior US officials have claimed that al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is now limited to as few as 100 fighters. Its leadership in Pakistan's tribal areas has been subject to a ferocious campaign of attrition by means of CIA drone strikes. Lashkar al-Zil may, therefore, enable al-Qaeda to have a greater impact in Afghanistan than the small numbers quoted might suggest. But it is clear that an exclusive focus on al-Qaeda as an organisation may be increasingly meaningless as other related groups take up the al-Qaeda baton.
Al-Qaeda's leadership recently received a shot in the arm when an undetermined number of its senior figures, as well as members of the family of fugitive leader Osama bin Laden, were released after being detained in Iran since 2002. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan, their release was brokered by Sirajuddin Haqqani, de facto leader of the Haqqani network, as part of negotiations that included the release of Heshmetollah Attarzadeh, an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Peshawar in late 2008. The same report suggested that Haqqani secured a supply of anti-aircraft weapons as part of the deal.
In addition to holding a number of al-Qaeda leaders under house arrest, Iran has for some time been supplying training, weapons and money to the Afghan Taliban as a relatively low-risk way of sustaining pressure on the US. The release of leaders as significant as Saif al-Adel, a former Egyptian military officer, and Suleiman abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti former al-Qaeda spokesman, suggests that Iran may have decided the moment has come to up the ante. Although experience suggests that any of the al-Qaeda leaders who make their way from Iran to Afghanistan or Pakistan will be targeted by CIA drone strikes, the return to battle of some experienced fighters with good strategic skills is bound to have an impact at least in the short term.
Continuing violence in Pakistan
Within Pakistan itself, levels of jihadist violence remained high throughout 2010, though the total number of fatalities, at 7,199, was markedly lower than the 2009 figure of 11,704, possibly reflecting the slowdown in military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. Following the operations in 2009 to clear the TTP out of Swat and South Waziristan, the Pakistani Army now has a presence in six of the seven tribal agencies with the majority of insurgents now bottled up in North Waziristan, which was the target of 104 of the 118 drone strikes launched by the CIA in 2010.
According to US Defense Secretary Gates, the Pakistani Army has transferred the equivalent of six divisions from the border with India, representing a significant departure from its previous preoccupations. It has so far resisted US pressure to move against militant groups in North Waziristan, citing the need to consolidate existing gains in the other tribal agencies and to allow its forces to rest and recuperate – a genuine necessity given the high level of casualties suffered during the 2009 operations.
Meanwhile within the settled areas, Pakistan has continued to see high levels of jihadist violence both against its security forces and other government targets, and against minority Shia and Ahmadiyah communities. Much of this violence has been perpetrated by groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammed, HUJI and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin which, together with LeT, are collectively known as the 'Punjab Taliban', a term which reflects their growing alignment with the TTP and Afghan Taliban. That such groups pose a serious threat to the Pakistani state is no longer in doubt and reflects the degree to which jihadism in Pakistan has become a double-edged sword. The growing culture of radicalisation within Pakistan was exemplified by the assassination on 4 January 2011 of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer by a member of his security detail. The assassin, who was allegedly under investigation for his extremist links, was motivated by a desire to punish Taseer for seeking amendments to Pakistan's harsh blasphemy laws. It is unclear whether he was linked to any specific group. The high level of public support for Taseer's murder, including among Pakistan's Islamic clergy, is indicative of the degree to which radical views have entered Pakistan's mainstream.
Green shoots?
Although South Asia remains a major focus of jihadist activity, the news from the region is not unremittingly bad. Intelligence cooperation between South Asian states has seen some cautious improvements over the past two years, notably between Pakistan and Afghanistan where intelligence relationships, though still suffering from high levels of mistrust, are starting to become institutionalised. There are faint signs that South Asian states see the need to take a more direct role in resolving regional differences, with Afghanistan possibly serving as a test case should conditions on the ground reach the point where a political negotiation is a realistic possibility. But in the long term the relationship between India and Pakistan remains the key determinant of regional stability. And for as long as the two states remain locked in an intelligence war, with India supporting Baluch separatist groups, and the TTP and Pakistan continuing to see jihadism as an asymmetric tool against India, a significant drop in violent extremism seems a remote prospect.
IISS
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/january/south-asia-still-beset-by-violent-extremism/
India: ISI moratorium brings relative calm
India to some extent bucked the regional trend with only one major act of jihadist violence during 2010 (though it was still plagued by high levels of Naxalite violence in the north, and there were renewed troubles in Kashmir). This was a bomb attack in February in Pune on a bakery popular with foreign visitors, which killed 17 people. Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT), the Pakistan-based group behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks, claimed responsibility. But a much-anticipated spate of attacks in the run-up to the Commonwealth Games, held in Delhi in October, did not materialise. This may reflect an improved performance on the part of India's security and intelligence agencies, aided by much-enhanced levels of US assistance, with 13 jihadist plots having been disrupted during the course of the year. It may also reflect efforts on the part of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to discourage further anti-Indian activity by LeT.
Interrogations by the US and India of David Coleman Headley (also known as Daoud Gilani), a US national of part-Pakistani parentage arrested by the FBI in late 2009, have offered important insights into the origins of the Mumbai attacks, in particular the extent of Pakistani official complicity. Headley had been involved in extensive reconnaissance of Mumbai targets on behalf of LeT and has told his interrogators that, at an operational level, ISI had advance knowledge of the operation.
According to Headley, who has pleaded guilty to the charges against him and is cooperating with the FBI, the ISI had seen the Mumbai attacks as a means of restoring the jihadist credentials of LeT. Many of LeT's members, frustrated by the restrictions imposed on them by ISI, had been leaving to join more extreme Pakistani jihadist groups which, in contrast to LeT, had turned against the Pakistani state. However, Headley's account suggests that the top leadership of ISI were not aware of the operation, indicating that ISI's command structure may be less efficient than has been supposed. According to Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, the ISI's chief, Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, admitted to then-CIA Director Mike Hayden that at least two retired Pakistani Army officers had been involved in planning the Mumbai attack. This is hardly reassuring given that ISI's 'S Wing', the department responsible for relations with jihadist groups and for operations outside Pakistan, is known to consist solely of retired military officers so that the government can deny responsibility for its actions. Shuja Pasha reportedly told Hayden: 'It was rogue … There may have been people associated with my organisation who were associated with this. That's different from authority, direction and control'.
The wealth of detail that has emerged about the Mumbai operation may have created pressure on ISI to impose a tighter moratorium on further such operations – though in late December 2010 the Indian government issued an alert relating to threats from LeT elements which had supposedly already infiltrated the country.
However, LeT does not appear to have been involved in an increase in violence in Kashmir, which for some years had been in an uneasy state of relative calm guaranteed by a pervasive Indian security presence. In June 2010 the death of a teenager in one of a series of stone-throwing confrontations with security forces led to rioting, which brought the Indian army out of their barracks and onto the streets. A curfew was reimposed. Although Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram initially accused LeT of fomenting unrest, the government has since acknowledged that the violence, which resulted in more than 60 civilian deaths, was in effect a popular uprising with no structure or leadership. The real causes of the unrest are both political and economic – an unrequited desire for independence and frustration with heavy security measures and alleged human-rights abuses, coupled with high levels of youth unemployment. The Indian government has partially acknowledged the validity of some grievances and has sought to minimise the use of force in controlling demonstrations.
Afghanistan: the key link
One reason for the relative lack of jihadist activity inside India may be that jihadism has moved westward, with many Pakistani extremist groups now increasingly focusing their efforts either on operations inside Afghanistan or against the Pakistani state, both in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or the settled areas, including Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
This shift is part of a complex series of moves in anticipation of an endgame in Afghanistan, which is widely expected at some point to involve a negotiation between the Afghan government and the main insurgent groups. Pakistan has sought to insert itself into any such negotiation by manipulating its relationships with some key jihadist groups: the Afghan Taliban, also known as the 'Quetta Shura'; the Haqqani network; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami; as well as LeT. According to General Michael T. Flynn, the senior US military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, LeT operatives are coming to Afghanistan in increasing numbers to gain combat experience and are active in eight Afghan provinces. Much of the focus of these groups, in particular the Haqqani network, has been on countering an Indian presence in Afghanistan which represents a constant source of strategic concern for Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistani politicians have begun to talk about the resolution of the Afghan conflict as more important than Kashmir in terms of defining their country's relations with India.
Pakistan's ultimate aim is a reasonably stable Afghanistan not inimical to Pakistan and in which Indian influence is limited to a point where it presents no strategic threat. Pakistani political leaders appear to have modified their position to a point where they talk publicly of not wishing to 'repeat the mistakes of the 1990s' – a reference to Pakistan's role in enabling the Taliban to assume power in 1996. Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani has been increasingly open in discussing with US counterparts Pakistan's interests and ability to help achieve a negotiated settlement. At the same time, Pakistan has shown itself ready to act forcefully to ensure a seat at the negotiating table for itself, as demonstrated by its arrests of a number of high-ranking members of the Quetta Shura – including Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – who were suspected of pursuing negotiations with the Afghan government independently of Pakistan.
Referring to it as a 'national interest', Pakistan has also been more ready to acknowledge the nature of its relationship with the Haqqani network, an organisation with close links to al-Qaeda that has been at the forefront of attacks against both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Indian interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan's increasingly thinly disguised support for the Haqqani network represents a source of increasing frustration to ISAF commanders, who have determined until now that hot-pursuit operations inside Pakistani territory would prove counterproductive. The nearest ISAF has come to such operations was in September 2010 when US forces killed two Pakistani border guards who were providing covering fire for Haqqani fighters escaping back from Afghanistan into Pakistan. This incident led Pakistan temporarily to close the Torkham Gate border crossing in Khyber Agency through which 1,000 trucks, carrying 25% of ISAF non-lethal supplies, cross each day into Afghanistan, and served as a reminder of ISAF's dependence on Pakistan's goodwill.
Lashkar al-Zil: alliance of jihadist groups
Meanwhile, links between a variety of jihadi groups spanning both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border appear to have grown closer. In 2009, ISAF sources in Afghanistan began to talk of the emergence of a new umbrella group, known as 'Lashkar al-Zil' – Shadow Army – comprising al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has been waging war against the Pakistani state in Pakistan's tribal areas and Swat. The commander of Lashkar al-Zil is reported to be Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior commander in the Pakistani jihadist group Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), who is also thought to have replaced Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, killed in a CIA drone strike in May 2010, as al-Qaeda's military chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kashmiri has also been identified as the driving force behind a number of recent al-Qaeda plots aimed at Western European targets.
Characterised as a replacement for al-Qaeda's Afghan-based guerrillas known as 'Brigade 055', it is far from clear how structured this new entity is. But ISAF commanders have cited evidence of increasing collaboration between jihadist groups which until recently had pursued their own agendas. Meanwhile, senior US officials have claimed that al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is now limited to as few as 100 fighters. Its leadership in Pakistan's tribal areas has been subject to a ferocious campaign of attrition by means of CIA drone strikes. Lashkar al-Zil may, therefore, enable al-Qaeda to have a greater impact in Afghanistan than the small numbers quoted might suggest. But it is clear that an exclusive focus on al-Qaeda as an organisation may be increasingly meaningless as other related groups take up the al-Qaeda baton.
Al-Qaeda's leadership recently received a shot in the arm when an undetermined number of its senior figures, as well as members of the family of fugitive leader Osama bin Laden, were released after being detained in Iran since 2002. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan, their release was brokered by Sirajuddin Haqqani, de facto leader of the Haqqani network, as part of negotiations that included the release of Heshmetollah Attarzadeh, an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Peshawar in late 2008. The same report suggested that Haqqani secured a supply of anti-aircraft weapons as part of the deal.
In addition to holding a number of al-Qaeda leaders under house arrest, Iran has for some time been supplying training, weapons and money to the Afghan Taliban as a relatively low-risk way of sustaining pressure on the US. The release of leaders as significant as Saif al-Adel, a former Egyptian military officer, and Suleiman abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti former al-Qaeda spokesman, suggests that Iran may have decided the moment has come to up the ante. Although experience suggests that any of the al-Qaeda leaders who make their way from Iran to Afghanistan or Pakistan will be targeted by CIA drone strikes, the return to battle of some experienced fighters with good strategic skills is bound to have an impact at least in the short term.
Continuing violence in Pakistan
Within Pakistan itself, levels of jihadist violence remained high throughout 2010, though the total number of fatalities, at 7,199, was markedly lower than the 2009 figure of 11,704, possibly reflecting the slowdown in military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. Following the operations in 2009 to clear the TTP out of Swat and South Waziristan, the Pakistani Army now has a presence in six of the seven tribal agencies with the majority of insurgents now bottled up in North Waziristan, which was the target of 104 of the 118 drone strikes launched by the CIA in 2010.
According to US Defense Secretary Gates, the Pakistani Army has transferred the equivalent of six divisions from the border with India, representing a significant departure from its previous preoccupations. It has so far resisted US pressure to move against militant groups in North Waziristan, citing the need to consolidate existing gains in the other tribal agencies and to allow its forces to rest and recuperate – a genuine necessity given the high level of casualties suffered during the 2009 operations.
Meanwhile within the settled areas, Pakistan has continued to see high levels of jihadist violence both against its security forces and other government targets, and against minority Shia and Ahmadiyah communities. Much of this violence has been perpetrated by groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammed, HUJI and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin which, together with LeT, are collectively known as the 'Punjab Taliban', a term which reflects their growing alignment with the TTP and Afghan Taliban. That such groups pose a serious threat to the Pakistani state is no longer in doubt and reflects the degree to which jihadism in Pakistan has become a double-edged sword. The growing culture of radicalisation within Pakistan was exemplified by the assassination on 4 January 2011 of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer by a member of his security detail. The assassin, who was allegedly under investigation for his extremist links, was motivated by a desire to punish Taseer for seeking amendments to Pakistan's harsh blasphemy laws. It is unclear whether he was linked to any specific group. The high level of public support for Taseer's murder, including among Pakistan's Islamic clergy, is indicative of the degree to which radical views have entered Pakistan's mainstream.
Green shoots?
Although South Asia remains a major focus of jihadist activity, the news from the region is not unremittingly bad. Intelligence cooperation between South Asian states has seen some cautious improvements over the past two years, notably between Pakistan and Afghanistan where intelligence relationships, though still suffering from high levels of mistrust, are starting to become institutionalised. There are faint signs that South Asian states see the need to take a more direct role in resolving regional differences, with Afghanistan possibly serving as a test case should conditions on the ground reach the point where a political negotiation is a realistic possibility. But in the long term the relationship between India and Pakistan remains the key determinant of regional stability. And for as long as the two states remain locked in an intelligence war, with India supporting Baluch separatist groups, and the TTP and Pakistan continuing to see jihadism as an asymmetric tool against India, a significant drop in violent extremism seems a remote prospect.
IISS
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/january/south-asia-still-beset-by-violent-extremism/
Clinton asks Arabs to help undermine Iran's nuclear plans
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, January 11, 2011; A12
ABU DHABI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES - Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton lobbied Arab governments on Monday to help tighten the screws on their Iranian neighbor, saying that sanctions and other measures are hurting Tehran and undermining its ability to acquire components for its nuclear program.
Clinton, in the Middle East for four days of talks, also pushed oil-rich Persian Gulf states to do more to back fragile governments in the West Bank and Iraq to create stability in a region that has so frequently veered into war.
The top U.S. diplomat expressed solidarity with Arabs in battling against domestic extremists, citing Saturday's attempted assassination of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords (D-Ariz.) as an example of extremist-inspired violence in the United States.
"That is not who you are, and that is not who we are," Clinton said in a television talk show in which she took questions from audience members. "We have to make clear that this does not represent either Arabs or Americans."
Repeating a theme she has sounded frequently in trips to the region, Clinton warned that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger an "extremely dangerous" arms race, and she said Arabs should show common cause with Western powers by helping enforce economic sanctions. She said current sanctions already were having a significant effect, echoing claims made by other administration officials in testimony in recent weeks.
"Sanctions have been working," Clinton said. "They have made it much more difficult for Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions."
Iran also is having unspecified "technological problems" that have made it slow down its timetables, Clinton said, a possible reference to technical glitches believed to have been caused by a computer virus. "But the real question is, how do we convince Iran that pursuing nuclear weapons will not make it safer and stronger, but just the opposite?" she asked.
Clinton also brought up Iran in private sessions with the United Arab Emirates' president, Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, and with Dubai's ruler, Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum. She is expected to travel to Oman and Qatar later in the week before returning to Washington.
Clinton made her public comments on the set of a popular women's television show, "Soft Talk" - the United Arab Emirates' equivalent of "The View" - where she chatted with the hosts on subjects ranging from her political career to her husband's saxophone playing. The hosts and questioners from the audience asked polite but pointed questions about the prospects for war in the Middle East and why the United States tolerated nuclear weapons for Israel but not for Iran. On the latter question, Clinton said the Obama administration supports the idea of a nuclear-free Middle East, eventually.
The Giffords shooting came up when a young woman in the audience asked why Americans seem to blame all Muslims for the actions of the handful of radicals responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Clinton assured the audience that most Americans are not anti-Muslim, but she explained that extremist voices are amplified because they command media attention.
Asked repeatedly about the foundering Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Clinton reiterated the Obama administration's support for an independent Palestine, but she also called on the gulf states to do more to foster economic stability in the West Bank to create conditions that could lead eventually to a prosperous, independent Palestinian state. Ultimately, to achieve peace, Israelis and Palestinians will have to want an accord badly enough to agree to painful compromises, she said. But in the meantime, there is "an essential role for outsiders," Clinton said.
W.P
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/10/AR2011011006157.html
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, January 11, 2011; A12
ABU DHABI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES - Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton lobbied Arab governments on Monday to help tighten the screws on their Iranian neighbor, saying that sanctions and other measures are hurting Tehran and undermining its ability to acquire components for its nuclear program.
Clinton, in the Middle East for four days of talks, also pushed oil-rich Persian Gulf states to do more to back fragile governments in the West Bank and Iraq to create stability in a region that has so frequently veered into war.
The top U.S. diplomat expressed solidarity with Arabs in battling against domestic extremists, citing Saturday's attempted assassination of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords (D-Ariz.) as an example of extremist-inspired violence in the United States.
"That is not who you are, and that is not who we are," Clinton said in a television talk show in which she took questions from audience members. "We have to make clear that this does not represent either Arabs or Americans."
Repeating a theme she has sounded frequently in trips to the region, Clinton warned that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger an "extremely dangerous" arms race, and she said Arabs should show common cause with Western powers by helping enforce economic sanctions. She said current sanctions already were having a significant effect, echoing claims made by other administration officials in testimony in recent weeks.
"Sanctions have been working," Clinton said. "They have made it much more difficult for Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions."
Iran also is having unspecified "technological problems" that have made it slow down its timetables, Clinton said, a possible reference to technical glitches believed to have been caused by a computer virus. "But the real question is, how do we convince Iran that pursuing nuclear weapons will not make it safer and stronger, but just the opposite?" she asked.
Clinton also brought up Iran in private sessions with the United Arab Emirates' president, Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, and with Dubai's ruler, Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum. She is expected to travel to Oman and Qatar later in the week before returning to Washington.
Clinton made her public comments on the set of a popular women's television show, "Soft Talk" - the United Arab Emirates' equivalent of "The View" - where she chatted with the hosts on subjects ranging from her political career to her husband's saxophone playing. The hosts and questioners from the audience asked polite but pointed questions about the prospects for war in the Middle East and why the United States tolerated nuclear weapons for Israel but not for Iran. On the latter question, Clinton said the Obama administration supports the idea of a nuclear-free Middle East, eventually.
The Giffords shooting came up when a young woman in the audience asked why Americans seem to blame all Muslims for the actions of the handful of radicals responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Clinton assured the audience that most Americans are not anti-Muslim, but she explained that extremist voices are amplified because they command media attention.
Asked repeatedly about the foundering Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Clinton reiterated the Obama administration's support for an independent Palestine, but she also called on the gulf states to do more to foster economic stability in the West Bank to create conditions that could lead eventually to a prosperous, independent Palestinian state. Ultimately, to achieve peace, Israelis and Palestinians will have to want an accord badly enough to agree to painful compromises, she said. But in the meantime, there is "an essential role for outsiders," Clinton said.
W.P
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/10/AR2011011006157.html
Saturday, January 8, 2011
In Sudan, an Election and a Beginning
By BARACK OBAMA
Washington
NOT every generation is given the chance to turn the page on the past and write a new chapter in history. Yet today — after 50 years of civil wars that have killed two million people and turned millions more into refugees — this is the opportunity before the people of southern Sudan.
Over the next week, millions of southern Sudanese will vote on whether to remain part of Sudan or to form their own independent nation. This process — and the actions of Sudanese leaders — will help determine whether people who have known so much suffering will move toward peace and prosperity, or slide backward into bloodshed. It will have consequences not only for Sudan, but also for sub-Saharan Africa and the world.
The historic vote is an exercise in self-determination long in the making, and it is a key part of the 2005 peace agreement that ended the civil war in Sudan. Yet just months ago, with preparations behind schedule, it was uncertain whether this referendum would take place at all. It is for this reason that I gathered with leaders from Sudan and around the world in September to make it clear that the international community was united in its belief that this referendum had to take place and that the will of the people of southern Sudan had to be respected, regardless of the outcome.
In an important step forward, leaders from both northern and southern Sudan — backed by more than 40 nations and international organizations — agreed to work together to ensure that the voting would be timely, peaceful, free and credible and would reflect the will of the Sudanese people. The fact that the voting appears to be starting on time is a tribute to those in Sudan who fulfilled their commitments. Most recently, the government of Sudan said that it would be the first to recognize the south if it voted for independence.
Now, the world is watching, united in its determination to make sure that all parties in Sudan live up to their obligations. As the referendum proceeds, voters must be allowed access to polling stations; they must be able to cast their ballots free from intimidation and coercion. All sides should refrain from inflammatory rhetoric or provocative actions that could raise tensions or prevent voters from expressing their will.
As the ballots are counted, all sides must resist prejudging the outcome. For the results to be credible, the commission that is overseeing the referendum must be free from pressure and interference. In the days ahead, leaders from north and south will need to work together to prevent violence and ensure that isolated incidents do not spiral into wider instability. Under no circumstance should any side use proxy forces in an effort to gain an advantage while we wait for the final results.
A successful vote will be cause for celebration and an inspiring step forward in Africa’s long journey toward democracy and justice. Still, lasting peace in Sudan will demand far more than a credible referendum.
The 2005 peace agreement must be fully implemented — a goal that will require compromise. Border disputes, and the status of the Abyei region, which straddles north and south, need to be resolved peacefully. The safety and citizenship of all Sudanese, especially minorities — southerners in the north and northerners in the south — have to be protected. Arrangements must be made for the transparent distribution of oil revenues, which can contribute to development. The return of refugees needs to be managed with extraordinary care to prevent another humanitarian catastrophe.
If the south chooses independence, the international community, including the United States, will have an interest in ensuring that the two nations that emerge succeed as stable and economically viable neighbors, because their fortunes are linked. Southern Sudan, in particular, will need partners in the long-term task of fulfilling the political and economic aspirations of its people.
Finally, there can be no lasting peace in Sudan without lasting peace in the western Sudan region of Darfur. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent Darfuris — and the plight of refugees like those I met in a camp in neighboring Chad five years ago — must never be forgotten. Here, too, the world is watching. The government of Sudan must live up to its international obligations. Attacks on civilians must stop. United Nations peacekeepers and aid workers must be free to reach those in need.
As I told Sudanese leaders in September, the United States will not abandon the people of Darfur. We will continue our diplomatic efforts to end the crisis there once and for all. Other nations must use their influence to bring all parties to the table and ensure they negotiate in good faith. And we will continue to insist that lasting peace in Darfur include accountability for crimes that have been committed, including genocide.
Along with our international partners, the United States will continue to play a leadership role in helping all the Sudanese people realize the peace and progress they deserve. Today, I am repeating my offer to Sudan’s leaders — if you fulfill your obligations and choose peace, there is a path to normal relations with the United States, including the lifting of economic sanctions and beginning the process, in accordance with United States law, of removing Sudan from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. In contrast, those who flout their international obligations will face more pressure and isolation.
Millions of Sudanese are making their way to the polls to determine their destiny. This is the moment when leaders of courage and vision can guide their people to a better day. Those who make the right choice will be remembered by history — they will also have a steady partner in the United States.
Barack Obama is the president of the United States.
NYT
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/opinion/09obama.html?_r=1
Washington
NOT every generation is given the chance to turn the page on the past and write a new chapter in history. Yet today — after 50 years of civil wars that have killed two million people and turned millions more into refugees — this is the opportunity before the people of southern Sudan.
Over the next week, millions of southern Sudanese will vote on whether to remain part of Sudan or to form their own independent nation. This process — and the actions of Sudanese leaders — will help determine whether people who have known so much suffering will move toward peace and prosperity, or slide backward into bloodshed. It will have consequences not only for Sudan, but also for sub-Saharan Africa and the world.
The historic vote is an exercise in self-determination long in the making, and it is a key part of the 2005 peace agreement that ended the civil war in Sudan. Yet just months ago, with preparations behind schedule, it was uncertain whether this referendum would take place at all. It is for this reason that I gathered with leaders from Sudan and around the world in September to make it clear that the international community was united in its belief that this referendum had to take place and that the will of the people of southern Sudan had to be respected, regardless of the outcome.
In an important step forward, leaders from both northern and southern Sudan — backed by more than 40 nations and international organizations — agreed to work together to ensure that the voting would be timely, peaceful, free and credible and would reflect the will of the Sudanese people. The fact that the voting appears to be starting on time is a tribute to those in Sudan who fulfilled their commitments. Most recently, the government of Sudan said that it would be the first to recognize the south if it voted for independence.
Now, the world is watching, united in its determination to make sure that all parties in Sudan live up to their obligations. As the referendum proceeds, voters must be allowed access to polling stations; they must be able to cast their ballots free from intimidation and coercion. All sides should refrain from inflammatory rhetoric or provocative actions that could raise tensions or prevent voters from expressing their will.
As the ballots are counted, all sides must resist prejudging the outcome. For the results to be credible, the commission that is overseeing the referendum must be free from pressure and interference. In the days ahead, leaders from north and south will need to work together to prevent violence and ensure that isolated incidents do not spiral into wider instability. Under no circumstance should any side use proxy forces in an effort to gain an advantage while we wait for the final results.
A successful vote will be cause for celebration and an inspiring step forward in Africa’s long journey toward democracy and justice. Still, lasting peace in Sudan will demand far more than a credible referendum.
The 2005 peace agreement must be fully implemented — a goal that will require compromise. Border disputes, and the status of the Abyei region, which straddles north and south, need to be resolved peacefully. The safety and citizenship of all Sudanese, especially minorities — southerners in the north and northerners in the south — have to be protected. Arrangements must be made for the transparent distribution of oil revenues, which can contribute to development. The return of refugees needs to be managed with extraordinary care to prevent another humanitarian catastrophe.
If the south chooses independence, the international community, including the United States, will have an interest in ensuring that the two nations that emerge succeed as stable and economically viable neighbors, because their fortunes are linked. Southern Sudan, in particular, will need partners in the long-term task of fulfilling the political and economic aspirations of its people.
Finally, there can be no lasting peace in Sudan without lasting peace in the western Sudan region of Darfur. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent Darfuris — and the plight of refugees like those I met in a camp in neighboring Chad five years ago — must never be forgotten. Here, too, the world is watching. The government of Sudan must live up to its international obligations. Attacks on civilians must stop. United Nations peacekeepers and aid workers must be free to reach those in need.
As I told Sudanese leaders in September, the United States will not abandon the people of Darfur. We will continue our diplomatic efforts to end the crisis there once and for all. Other nations must use their influence to bring all parties to the table and ensure they negotiate in good faith. And we will continue to insist that lasting peace in Darfur include accountability for crimes that have been committed, including genocide.
Along with our international partners, the United States will continue to play a leadership role in helping all the Sudanese people realize the peace and progress they deserve. Today, I am repeating my offer to Sudan’s leaders — if you fulfill your obligations and choose peace, there is a path to normal relations with the United States, including the lifting of economic sanctions and beginning the process, in accordance with United States law, of removing Sudan from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. In contrast, those who flout their international obligations will face more pressure and isolation.
Millions of Sudanese are making their way to the polls to determine their destiny. This is the moment when leaders of courage and vision can guide their people to a better day. Those who make the right choice will be remembered by history — they will also have a steady partner in the United States.
Barack Obama is the president of the United States.
NYT
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/opinion/09obama.html?_r=1
Southern Sudan on cusp of independence as voters heads to polls Sunday
IN JUBA, SUDAN Millions of southern Sudanese head to the polls Sunday to decide whether to secede from the north in a historic vote that is widely expected to create the world's newest nation.
After a long and bloody civil war, and after decades of sectarian and ethnic animosities, the mood in this southern capital was electric.
Banners on street corners urged people to vote for secession. Cars carried southern Sudanese flags and bumper stickers that declared "Separation." People danced and sang at rallies and spontaneous celebrations, shouting their support for independence.
"This vote is about gaining our freedom. It's about gaining our dignity," said Kur Ayuen Kou, 32, who had returned to southern Sudan from Australia. He was one of 4 million people displaced by the conflict. "It's about ending our slavery."
But the week-long referendum, the last stage in a U.S.-backed peace process that ended the war, will take place under a cloud of uncertainty.
Many issues that will determine the relationship between the north and south remain unresolved, key among them citizenship rights, contentious border areas and the sharing of Sudan's massive oil reserves after the referendum, the majority of which lie in the south.
The tensions have triggered fears that conflict could erupt again in the months ahead, destabilizing a region where the United States is fighting the rise of Islamic radicalism.
A day before voting began, six people were killed in clashes between southern Sudan's army and rebel militias in an oil-producing region.
An independent southern Sudan would become one of the world's least developed countries, its population among the poorest and most vulnerable, despite receiving nearly $10 billion in oil revenue since 2005. But the region, which is roughly the size of Texas, has few schools, hospitals and paved roads. Illiteracy and malnutrition remain high.
A peaceful vote, and an outcome accepted without dispute, could lay the groundwork for one of the Obama administration's most significant policy successes in Africa. Activists and aid groups have criticized the administration for not being more engaged on the continent and lacking a cohesive policy, especially for Sudan.
On Saturday, U.S. officials arrived in Juba, the southern region's capital, to support the referendum and offer assurances that the United States is committed to southern Sudan's future.
"President Obama has personally invested in Sudan. . . . He's briefed every day on what happens here," J. Scott Gration, the U.S. special envoy to Sudan, told reporters. "That same commitment will continue after the referendum."
Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), standing next to Gration, added, "The stability of Sudan is important for all us, for a world that is becoming increasingly more complicated, increasingly more volatile, increasingly more extreme in various places."
More than 2 million people died in the 22-year-long civil war, which pitted Arab Islamic rulers in the north against the south's animist and Christian rebels.
Since 2005, when a peace treaty was signed, the south has been semiautonomous, ruled by the former rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. As a condition of the peace deal, brokered by the George W. Bush administration, the south was guaranteed a vote on independence.
Nearly 3.9 million people have registered to vote, and a turnout of 60 percent is needed for the results to be valid. Tens of thousands of southerners have arrived here from northern Sudan and from around the world to participate, some carrying all their possessions and hoping to resettle in the south.
The killing in southern Sudan, though, hasn't stopped. Last year, at least 900 people died in tribal fighting and 215,000 were displaced, aid groups say. Weapons are widely available, and militias are abundant. Clan rivalries and corruption are rife. And the gulf between light-complexioned Arabs and darker-skinned Africans remains wide.
Only a few months ago, it was unclear whether the referendum would take place as scheduled. Nearly 80 percent of Sudan's oil is in the south, and few believed Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir would ever allow the south to gain independence. Southern leaders and U.S. officials accused Bashir and his ruling National Congress Party of arming militias to destabilize the south in order to delay the vote. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called south Sudan "a ticking time bomb."
Four months ago, the Obama administration stepped up its engagement with Bashir, offering him incentives, including the possibility that the United States would remove Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism if a timely referendum took place.
Bashir, who came to power in a bloodless military coup in 1989, is facing pressure from outside and inside Sudan. The International Criminal Court has indicted him on genocide charges, accusing him of orchestrating ethnic cleansing in the western region of Darfur. Both Washington and the United Nations have imposed economic sanctions on Sudan. Clashes between Bashir's army and rebels in Darfur have intensified in recent months.
But Bashir and other senior officials appear to have accepted that the south's secession is unavoidable, breaking from party hard-liners who want to keep the south at any cost. Last week, Bashir declared he would be "the first to recognize the south" if voters chose to create their own country.
In an interview Saturday, Kerry said he believes the likelihood of conflict, while still a concern, has diminished.
An independent and mostly Christian south Sudan would also allow Bashir to fulfill a long-held vision of enshrining Islamic sharia law in the constitution, making Islam the north's official religion and Arabic its official language.
One core flash point is the oil-producing border region of Abyei. The south claims it as its own, but the north wants part of it. Tribal militias aligned with both sides live in a tense coexistence, tussling over land, water and grazing areas.
"If you don't resolve Abyei and you don't have some kind of a solution for the border, you risk continuing a sort of low-intensity conflict along the border, which could spiral out of control," said Zach Vertin, Sudan analyst for the International Crisis Group think tank.
A separate referendum for Abyei on whether to join the north or the south has been postponed as leaders work on reaching a compromise.
Nationality is also an issue. It is unclear whether dual citizenship will be allowed between the north and south. If not, many analysts fear that northerners living in the south and southerners living in the north could face targeted attacks or be stripped of their citizenship. That could trigger displacements that would add more stress on poor communities already facing shortages of food, water and medicine.
"We have an unfolding humanitarian crisis layered on top of an existing and forsaken one," said Susan Purdin, the southern Sudan director for the International Rescue Committee, an American relief agency. "And then there's the potential for mass displacement, an upsurge in political and ethnic violence and a larger-scale humanitarian emergency."
Despite its vast oil revenue, southern Sudan has less than 40 miles of paved road. An estimated 80 percent of adults cannot read or write. Less than half the population has access to clean water; one in 10 children die before their first birthday. The police force is poorly trained, and the judicial system is weak.
"We face many challenges ahead of us," said Zachariah Peter Champail, 40, a teacher. "Tribal rivalries is the fatal disease that could kill us in the south. I hope, by the mercy of God, we can overcome this. We have to sing together in unity."
W.P
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/08/AR2011010803388.html?wprss=rss_world
After a long and bloody civil war, and after decades of sectarian and ethnic animosities, the mood in this southern capital was electric.
Banners on street corners urged people to vote for secession. Cars carried southern Sudanese flags and bumper stickers that declared "Separation." People danced and sang at rallies and spontaneous celebrations, shouting their support for independence.
"This vote is about gaining our freedom. It's about gaining our dignity," said Kur Ayuen Kou, 32, who had returned to southern Sudan from Australia. He was one of 4 million people displaced by the conflict. "It's about ending our slavery."
But the week-long referendum, the last stage in a U.S.-backed peace process that ended the war, will take place under a cloud of uncertainty.
Many issues that will determine the relationship between the north and south remain unresolved, key among them citizenship rights, contentious border areas and the sharing of Sudan's massive oil reserves after the referendum, the majority of which lie in the south.
The tensions have triggered fears that conflict could erupt again in the months ahead, destabilizing a region where the United States is fighting the rise of Islamic radicalism.
A day before voting began, six people were killed in clashes between southern Sudan's army and rebel militias in an oil-producing region.
An independent southern Sudan would become one of the world's least developed countries, its population among the poorest and most vulnerable, despite receiving nearly $10 billion in oil revenue since 2005. But the region, which is roughly the size of Texas, has few schools, hospitals and paved roads. Illiteracy and malnutrition remain high.
A peaceful vote, and an outcome accepted without dispute, could lay the groundwork for one of the Obama administration's most significant policy successes in Africa. Activists and aid groups have criticized the administration for not being more engaged on the continent and lacking a cohesive policy, especially for Sudan.
On Saturday, U.S. officials arrived in Juba, the southern region's capital, to support the referendum and offer assurances that the United States is committed to southern Sudan's future.
"President Obama has personally invested in Sudan. . . . He's briefed every day on what happens here," J. Scott Gration, the U.S. special envoy to Sudan, told reporters. "That same commitment will continue after the referendum."
Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), standing next to Gration, added, "The stability of Sudan is important for all us, for a world that is becoming increasingly more complicated, increasingly more volatile, increasingly more extreme in various places."
More than 2 million people died in the 22-year-long civil war, which pitted Arab Islamic rulers in the north against the south's animist and Christian rebels.
Since 2005, when a peace treaty was signed, the south has been semiautonomous, ruled by the former rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. As a condition of the peace deal, brokered by the George W. Bush administration, the south was guaranteed a vote on independence.
Nearly 3.9 million people have registered to vote, and a turnout of 60 percent is needed for the results to be valid. Tens of thousands of southerners have arrived here from northern Sudan and from around the world to participate, some carrying all their possessions and hoping to resettle in the south.
The killing in southern Sudan, though, hasn't stopped. Last year, at least 900 people died in tribal fighting and 215,000 were displaced, aid groups say. Weapons are widely available, and militias are abundant. Clan rivalries and corruption are rife. And the gulf between light-complexioned Arabs and darker-skinned Africans remains wide.
Only a few months ago, it was unclear whether the referendum would take place as scheduled. Nearly 80 percent of Sudan's oil is in the south, and few believed Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir would ever allow the south to gain independence. Southern leaders and U.S. officials accused Bashir and his ruling National Congress Party of arming militias to destabilize the south in order to delay the vote. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called south Sudan "a ticking time bomb."
Four months ago, the Obama administration stepped up its engagement with Bashir, offering him incentives, including the possibility that the United States would remove Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism if a timely referendum took place.
Bashir, who came to power in a bloodless military coup in 1989, is facing pressure from outside and inside Sudan. The International Criminal Court has indicted him on genocide charges, accusing him of orchestrating ethnic cleansing in the western region of Darfur. Both Washington and the United Nations have imposed economic sanctions on Sudan. Clashes between Bashir's army and rebels in Darfur have intensified in recent months.
But Bashir and other senior officials appear to have accepted that the south's secession is unavoidable, breaking from party hard-liners who want to keep the south at any cost. Last week, Bashir declared he would be "the first to recognize the south" if voters chose to create their own country.
In an interview Saturday, Kerry said he believes the likelihood of conflict, while still a concern, has diminished.
An independent and mostly Christian south Sudan would also allow Bashir to fulfill a long-held vision of enshrining Islamic sharia law in the constitution, making Islam the north's official religion and Arabic its official language.
One core flash point is the oil-producing border region of Abyei. The south claims it as its own, but the north wants part of it. Tribal militias aligned with both sides live in a tense coexistence, tussling over land, water and grazing areas.
"If you don't resolve Abyei and you don't have some kind of a solution for the border, you risk continuing a sort of low-intensity conflict along the border, which could spiral out of control," said Zach Vertin, Sudan analyst for the International Crisis Group think tank.
A separate referendum for Abyei on whether to join the north or the south has been postponed as leaders work on reaching a compromise.
Nationality is also an issue. It is unclear whether dual citizenship will be allowed between the north and south. If not, many analysts fear that northerners living in the south and southerners living in the north could face targeted attacks or be stripped of their citizenship. That could trigger displacements that would add more stress on poor communities already facing shortages of food, water and medicine.
"We have an unfolding humanitarian crisis layered on top of an existing and forsaken one," said Susan Purdin, the southern Sudan director for the International Rescue Committee, an American relief agency. "And then there's the potential for mass displacement, an upsurge in political and ethnic violence and a larger-scale humanitarian emergency."
Despite its vast oil revenue, southern Sudan has less than 40 miles of paved road. An estimated 80 percent of adults cannot read or write. Less than half the population has access to clean water; one in 10 children die before their first birthday. The police force is poorly trained, and the judicial system is weak.
"We face many challenges ahead of us," said Zachariah Peter Champail, 40, a teacher. "Tribal rivalries is the fatal disease that could kill us in the south. I hope, by the mercy of God, we can overcome this. We have to sing together in unity."
W.P
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/08/AR2011010803388.html?wprss=rss_world
Southern Sudan Feels Freedom Close at Hand
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
JUBA, Sudan — Philip Geng Nyuol started fighting for independence with his hands.
He eventually graduated to a machete, then Molotov cocktails, then a gun.
“I crossed rivers full of crocodiles,” he said. “And slept in camps in Congo. And ate wild fruits in the bush.”
That was nearly 50 years ago — Mr. Nyuol was on the ground floor of southern Sudan’s independence struggle, before the rebels even had proper weapons. The memories come flooding back to him, bright but patchy, like sun streaming through the trees.
On Sunday, after decades of war and more than two million lives lost, southern Sudan will get the moment it has been yearning for, a referendum on independence. All signs point to the people here voting overwhelmingly for secession, and the largest country on the continent will then begin the delicate process of splitting in two.
The United States government has played a pivotal role in bringing this moment to fruition, pushing the northern and southern Sudanese to sign a peace treaty in 2005 that set the referendum in motion. A proud, new African country is about to be born, but it will step onto the world stage with shaky legs. As it stands now, southern Sudan is one of the poorest places on earth.
Most people here scrape by on less than 75 cents a day. More than three-quarters of adults cannot read. Decades of civil war and marginalization have left the economy so crushed that just about everything is imported, down to eggs. According to Oxfam, a teenage girl has a higher chance of dying in childbirth than finishing elementary school.
Tens of thousands have flocked back to take part in the referendum, and some analysts, possibly reinforcing stereotypes of Africa as always teetering on the edge, warn south Sudan could be the next Somalia, awash in violence. Already, aid agencies are ringing the alarm about a lack of food, water, health care and sanitation.
“We have an unfolding humanitarian crisis, layered on top of an existing and forsaken one,” said the International Rescue Committee, an American aid organization that works in Sudan.
But this is a land of shared sacrifice, and that may be a cohesive force that helps hold southern Sudan together. After all the years of guerrilla warfare and hardship, oppression and persecution at the hands of the Arabs who rule Sudan, people here are deeply invested in holding a peaceful referendum and building the world’s newest nation.
“We are underdeveloped, yes, but we will do it,” said Gideon Gatpan Thoar, the information minister of Unity State, near the north-south border.
United Nations officials here say something remarkable has already happened. In 2009, ethnic fighting swept the south, with several thousand people killed in military-grade attacks, fueled by longstanding ethnic rivalries and a sudden, suspicious increase in high-powered weaponry. Many southerners suspected that the government in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, was instigating the violence, just as it had in the past when Khartoum fomented a civil war within a civil war.
But in the past six months, there has been almost no major ethnic violence. One of the last holdouts, a renegade general who had been leading a revolt deep in the bush, recently agreed to a cease-fire. “What we are seeing is a real effort for reconciliation,” said a United Nations official in Juba, who was not authorized to speak to the news media and spoke anonymously. “All eyes are on the referendum. They’re all trying to get along now.”
But the official added, “Everybody knows these issues will come up in the future.”
Many northern Sudanese who work in the south are now fleeing. Stocks of goods are going down; prices are going up. People are still talking about what-ifs and the possibility of war, because even after the referendum, some very thorny issues need to be carefully handled before the south can peacefully break off. (The actual declaration of independence is scheduled for July.).
The south produces around 75 percent of Sudan’s oil, but it is landlocked, so some arrangement will have to be struck for southern oil to keep flowing through the pipeline in the north. The border will also have to be demarcated, including the tinderbox Abyei area, where Arab nomads historically have crossed back and forth. Billions of dollars of debt will have to be shared.
But most southerners are not thinking of technicalities. This is not simply a political moment, a time for a new line on the map or a new seat at the United Nations.
“This is a dream,” Mr. Nyuol said, “a dream we always hoped would come true, even if it took one thousand years.”
All over the streets of Juba, the capital of the south, brightly colored banners flaunt images of a single open hand, the ballot symbol that stands for secession. In towns across the south, loudspeakers blast messages of freedom. And salvation.
“We are going, we are going, we are going to the promised land,” sang a preacher in Yei, about 100 miles southwest of Juba.
The south is filled with people who have paid for this referendum with their own blood. Amputees hobble down the street in Juba with barely a glance up at the new ministries that their lost limbs helped bring to reality.
Veterans are everywhere, reflective of a society in which men, women and children were all mobilized to fight for independence.
Rose Hawa Simon, a copper-skinned woman with a million-dollar smile, never thought she would see this day, or even that she would be alive right now. She was one of the few female tank drivers for the southern rebels, and in March 1997 her tank was hit and she was shot twice fleeing the flaming wreckage. She does not question the sacrifice.
“Our people were suffering, our people were killed,” she said. “I said: ‘Let me join. Let me go.’ I started training on that tank, because my heart was broken.”
Alex Taban is another former bush fighter. His son, Jackson, followed in his footsteps and joined the rebellion. Jackson was killed in 1997 and buried on the battlefield. As the referendum approaches, Mr. Taban said, “The thoughts are there.”
The British colonizers planted a political minefield in the 1920s when they drew a line across the bottom third of Sudan and declared that northern and southern Sudanese should remain separate. Part of the reason was to check the spread of Islam. To this day, the upper part of Sudan is mainly Muslim and controlled by Arabs; the lower third is mostly animist and Christian, linguistically and culturally more in tune with Kenya, Uganda and central Africa..
A group of southern soldiers mutinied in 1955, a year before Sudan was granted independence. The civil war had begun.
By 1958, Mr. Nyuol, who is in his 70s (though he is not sure of his exact age), was organizing protests at his high school.
“Even then, we could tell what was happening,” he said. “They wanted to Islamize us. They were building mosques all over the place. They wanted us to change our names.”
He went to the forest in 1963. He laid ambushes. He firebombed the cars of Arabs. In the 1980s, after working as a high school math teacher, he ran underground cells to send food and matériel into the bush.
He plans to show up at the polls at dawn on Sunday, even though voting will continue for one week to allow people in far-flung areas to cast their ballots. He will vote for the open hand, for secession, he said.
“We have waited for this, we have fought for it,” he said.
And when the voting is over, he will return to his work building an archive of old pictures of his comrades who died in the 1960s.
Josh Kron contributed reporting.
NYT
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/africa/09sudan.html?src=twt&twt=nytimes
JUBA, Sudan — Philip Geng Nyuol started fighting for independence with his hands.
He eventually graduated to a machete, then Molotov cocktails, then a gun.
“I crossed rivers full of crocodiles,” he said. “And slept in camps in Congo. And ate wild fruits in the bush.”
That was nearly 50 years ago — Mr. Nyuol was on the ground floor of southern Sudan’s independence struggle, before the rebels even had proper weapons. The memories come flooding back to him, bright but patchy, like sun streaming through the trees.
On Sunday, after decades of war and more than two million lives lost, southern Sudan will get the moment it has been yearning for, a referendum on independence. All signs point to the people here voting overwhelmingly for secession, and the largest country on the continent will then begin the delicate process of splitting in two.
The United States government has played a pivotal role in bringing this moment to fruition, pushing the northern and southern Sudanese to sign a peace treaty in 2005 that set the referendum in motion. A proud, new African country is about to be born, but it will step onto the world stage with shaky legs. As it stands now, southern Sudan is one of the poorest places on earth.
Most people here scrape by on less than 75 cents a day. More than three-quarters of adults cannot read. Decades of civil war and marginalization have left the economy so crushed that just about everything is imported, down to eggs. According to Oxfam, a teenage girl has a higher chance of dying in childbirth than finishing elementary school.
Tens of thousands have flocked back to take part in the referendum, and some analysts, possibly reinforcing stereotypes of Africa as always teetering on the edge, warn south Sudan could be the next Somalia, awash in violence. Already, aid agencies are ringing the alarm about a lack of food, water, health care and sanitation.
“We have an unfolding humanitarian crisis, layered on top of an existing and forsaken one,” said the International Rescue Committee, an American aid organization that works in Sudan.
But this is a land of shared sacrifice, and that may be a cohesive force that helps hold southern Sudan together. After all the years of guerrilla warfare and hardship, oppression and persecution at the hands of the Arabs who rule Sudan, people here are deeply invested in holding a peaceful referendum and building the world’s newest nation.
“We are underdeveloped, yes, but we will do it,” said Gideon Gatpan Thoar, the information minister of Unity State, near the north-south border.
United Nations officials here say something remarkable has already happened. In 2009, ethnic fighting swept the south, with several thousand people killed in military-grade attacks, fueled by longstanding ethnic rivalries and a sudden, suspicious increase in high-powered weaponry. Many southerners suspected that the government in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, was instigating the violence, just as it had in the past when Khartoum fomented a civil war within a civil war.
But in the past six months, there has been almost no major ethnic violence. One of the last holdouts, a renegade general who had been leading a revolt deep in the bush, recently agreed to a cease-fire. “What we are seeing is a real effort for reconciliation,” said a United Nations official in Juba, who was not authorized to speak to the news media and spoke anonymously. “All eyes are on the referendum. They’re all trying to get along now.”
But the official added, “Everybody knows these issues will come up in the future.”
Many northern Sudanese who work in the south are now fleeing. Stocks of goods are going down; prices are going up. People are still talking about what-ifs and the possibility of war, because even after the referendum, some very thorny issues need to be carefully handled before the south can peacefully break off. (The actual declaration of independence is scheduled for July.).
The south produces around 75 percent of Sudan’s oil, but it is landlocked, so some arrangement will have to be struck for southern oil to keep flowing through the pipeline in the north. The border will also have to be demarcated, including the tinderbox Abyei area, where Arab nomads historically have crossed back and forth. Billions of dollars of debt will have to be shared.
But most southerners are not thinking of technicalities. This is not simply a political moment, a time for a new line on the map or a new seat at the United Nations.
“This is a dream,” Mr. Nyuol said, “a dream we always hoped would come true, even if it took one thousand years.”
All over the streets of Juba, the capital of the south, brightly colored banners flaunt images of a single open hand, the ballot symbol that stands for secession. In towns across the south, loudspeakers blast messages of freedom. And salvation.
“We are going, we are going, we are going to the promised land,” sang a preacher in Yei, about 100 miles southwest of Juba.
The south is filled with people who have paid for this referendum with their own blood. Amputees hobble down the street in Juba with barely a glance up at the new ministries that their lost limbs helped bring to reality.
Veterans are everywhere, reflective of a society in which men, women and children were all mobilized to fight for independence.
Rose Hawa Simon, a copper-skinned woman with a million-dollar smile, never thought she would see this day, or even that she would be alive right now. She was one of the few female tank drivers for the southern rebels, and in March 1997 her tank was hit and she was shot twice fleeing the flaming wreckage. She does not question the sacrifice.
“Our people were suffering, our people were killed,” she said. “I said: ‘Let me join. Let me go.’ I started training on that tank, because my heart was broken.”
Alex Taban is another former bush fighter. His son, Jackson, followed in his footsteps and joined the rebellion. Jackson was killed in 1997 and buried on the battlefield. As the referendum approaches, Mr. Taban said, “The thoughts are there.”
The British colonizers planted a political minefield in the 1920s when they drew a line across the bottom third of Sudan and declared that northern and southern Sudanese should remain separate. Part of the reason was to check the spread of Islam. To this day, the upper part of Sudan is mainly Muslim and controlled by Arabs; the lower third is mostly animist and Christian, linguistically and culturally more in tune with Kenya, Uganda and central Africa..
A group of southern soldiers mutinied in 1955, a year before Sudan was granted independence. The civil war had begun.
By 1958, Mr. Nyuol, who is in his 70s (though he is not sure of his exact age), was organizing protests at his high school.
“Even then, we could tell what was happening,” he said. “They wanted to Islamize us. They were building mosques all over the place. They wanted us to change our names.”
He went to the forest in 1963. He laid ambushes. He firebombed the cars of Arabs. In the 1980s, after working as a high school math teacher, he ran underground cells to send food and matériel into the bush.
He plans to show up at the polls at dawn on Sunday, even though voting will continue for one week to allow people in far-flung areas to cast their ballots. He will vote for the open hand, for secession, he said.
“We have waited for this, we have fought for it,” he said.
And when the voting is over, he will return to his work building an archive of old pictures of his comrades who died in the 1960s.
Josh Kron contributed reporting.
NYT
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/africa/09sudan.html?src=twt&twt=nytimes
Officials Optimistic About Sudan Vote
By THE NEW YORK TIMES
Published: January 8, 2011
JUBA, Sudan — Sudanese and American officials said that Sudan appeared well prepared for a historic vote on Sunday on southern Sudan’s independence.
J. Scott Gration, President Obama’s special envoy to Sudan, complimented the country’s preparations for an “on-time, peaceful and transparent referendum.”
A few months ago, United States officials voiced concern that Sudan could revert to civil war if the referendum was mishandled.
But on Saturday, Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, who is visiting Sudan to monitor the election, said those risks had been very significantly reduced.
News agency reports said that at least six people were killed Friday and Saturday in fighting between southern Sudan’s army and a rebel militia.
NYT
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/africa/09juba.html?src=twt&twt=nytimes
Published: January 8, 2011
JUBA, Sudan — Sudanese and American officials said that Sudan appeared well prepared for a historic vote on Sunday on southern Sudan’s independence.
J. Scott Gration, President Obama’s special envoy to Sudan, complimented the country’s preparations for an “on-time, peaceful and transparent referendum.”
A few months ago, United States officials voiced concern that Sudan could revert to civil war if the referendum was mishandled.
But on Saturday, Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, who is visiting Sudan to monitor the election, said those risks had been very significantly reduced.
News agency reports said that at least six people were killed Friday and Saturday in fighting between southern Sudan’s army and a rebel militia.
NYT
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/africa/09juba.html?src=twt&twt=nytimes
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